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Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense
Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines
David Yellen*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable and controversial aspects of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") is that the length
of a defendant's sentence may be based, not only upon the
crimes for which the defendant has been convicted, but also
upon alleged crimes related to the offense of conviction, for
which the defendant was not convicted. For example, a defendant convicted of embezzling money may be sentenced as if he
had been convicted of several additional alleged embezzlements,
notwithstanding the government's failure to bring such additional charges, the dismissal of the charges as part of a plea
agreement, or even the defendant's acquittal of the additional
charges.
The United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing
Commission") adopted this "alleged related-offense" sentencing
as part of its attempt to resolve a central question posed in forming any comprehensive sentencing system: what range of information should be considered in fashioning an appropriate
sentence? At one extreme, a sentencing regime might impose
identical sentences on all offenders convicted of violating the
same statute. At the other extreme, judges might be authorized
or required to consider all of the available information about an
offender's life, as well as evidence concerning the offense of conviction. This dichotomy is commonly referred to, in terms that
conceal as much as they reveal, as the choice between chargeoffense and real-offense sentencing.'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A. 1979, Princeton
University; J.D. 1984, Cornell University. I am grateful to Robin Charlow,
Larry Kessler, Carl Mayer, Marc Miller and Michael Tonry for their comments.

1. See U.S.

SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUiELNEs

MNuAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a) (1993) [hereinafter U.S.S.G..
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Rather than binary alternatives, charge- and real-offense
sentencing represent the end points of a continuum of possible
sentencing information. Real-offense and charge-offense sentencing are like a Scylla and Charybdis through which drafters
of sentencing guidelines must attempt to navigate. Real-offense
sentencing may be overly complex, administratively burdensome, and manifestly unfair in at least some of its applications.
Charge-offense sentencing may fail to adequately distinguish offenders based on their culpability and may shift sentencing discretion to the prosecutor. Sentencing policy makers, in selecting
a point along this continuum, must weigh the relevance to the
sentencing decision of various categories of information about
the offense and the offender, and consider the fairness of basing
punishment on facts beyond those established by a conviction.
In so doing, policy makers must bear in mind the potential conflict between their goals and the realities of the criminal justice
system, particularly plea bargaining practices. The choice between charge- and real-offense sentencing thus has both practical and philosophical implications for any attempt to create a
more just and effective sentencing system.
The members of the Sentencing Commission2 regarded the
election between charge-offense and real-offense oriented approaches as a cardinal assignment when they set out to draft the
Guidelines in the mid-1980s. 3 In what members of the Sentencing Commission have called a "key compromise" 4 that formed
the "cornerstone"5 of the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission ultimately settled on an ambitious and innovative approach, combining elements of both charge- and real-offense
sentencing.
This Article examines the Guidelines' approach to real-offense sentencing, particularly its employment of alleged relatedoffense sentencing. There has never before been an opportunity
to investigate a functioning real-offense sentencing system. The
Sentencing Commission's decision to employ a strong version of
mandatory real-offense sentencing, particularly its inclusion of
alleged related-offense sentencing, is unprecedented in the his-

2. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988).
3. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, ch.1, pt. A(4)(a).
4. Stephen Breyer, The FederalSentencing Guidelines and the Key Cornpromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1 (1988).
5. William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rav. 495 (1990).
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tory of American sentencing systems. 6 Although at least some
real-offense sentencing practices have a long history of judicial
acceptance, prior to the Guidelines they were generally hidden,
because a judge's decision as to the scope of information to be
included in the sentencing process was discretionary and often
unexplained. 7 For the first time, six years after the introduction
of the Guidelines, an assessment of real-offense sentencing can
draw upon the actual experience of creating and implementing
such a system.
The conclusions of this Article can be summarized briefly.
The Sentencing Commission's decision to require alleged related-offense sentencing was ill-conceived and poorly executed,
and has contributed to a system plagued by illogic and injustice.
The Guidelines fail to reflect a sound rationale for any use of
alleged related-offense sentencing, much less for the particular
manner in which it is used. The Sentencing Commission also
failed to foresee that plea bargaining practices would largely undermine the imagined benefits of this far-reaching form of realoffense sentencing. Although the tension between charge- and
real-offense sentencing is real, alleged related-offense sentencing has been revealed as an illusory remedy.
Part II of this Article defines and contrasts charge- and
real-offense sentencing and discusses the significance of each
approach. After developing a working definition of charge- and
real-offense sentencing, this framework is then applied to the
pre-Guidelines federal sentencing system, in order to describe
the extent to which it was charge- or real-offense based. Finally
6. Traditional sentencing systems based on judicial discretion have realoffense aspects, but they are not mandatory. See infra part II.C. None of the
state sentencing guidelines systems adopted prior to the federal guidelines incorporated mandatory real-offense sentencing. See Michael Tonry, Salvaging
the Sentencing Guidelines in Seven Easy Steps, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 355,
356-57 (1992) [hereinafter Tonry, Seven Easy Steps]; see also infra notes 129,
203, 217 & 229 (discussing state guidelines' approach to real-offense
sentencing).
In 1978 the Uniform Law Commissioners adopted a Model Sentencing and
Corrections Act calling for comprehensive real-offense sentencing, but no state
adopted that proposal. See MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS AcT, 10
U.L.A. Sentencing Act Special Pamphlet (1985) [hereinafter MODEL AcT]. For
a critique of this proposal, see Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The
Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct, 72 J. CRim. L. & CRIINOLOGY 1550
(1981) [hereinafter Tonry, Real Offense]. A real-offense model has been applied
to parole decisions. In the 1970's, the United States Parole Commission developed its own guidelines to govern release decisions, and those guidelines were
in large part real-offense oriented. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (1980).
7. See infra part II.C.
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this section considers the important implications plea bargaining has on the choice between charge- and real-offense guidelines regimes.
Part III describes the Sentencing Commission's compromise
between charge- and real-offense sentencing. This section goes
on to identify those aspects of the Guidelines that are chargeoffense oriented and those that are more real-offense in nature.
Part IV considers in more detail the Guidelines' version of
alleged related-offense sentencing. Initially, this section illustrates the dramatic impact this approach has on many
sentences. This impact varies greatly among categories of offenses and is marked by inconsistency and apparent anomalies.
Next, this section scrutinizes the Sentencing Commission's rationale for alleged related-offense sentencing. The Sentencing
Commission's explanation for incorporating alleged related-offense sentencing at all, and for then treating different categories
of offenses dramatically differently, is surprisingly superficial
and opaque. This section considers alternative rationales and
finds them similarly unconvincing, leading to the conclusion
that there is no sound rationale for alleged related-offense sentencing. Finally, this section discusses how, even when taken on
its own terms, the Guidelines' version of alleged related-offense
sentencing does not achieve the Sentencing Commission's goals.
Part V considers possible reforms of the Guidelines' current
approach. This section concludes by suggesting a framework for
future sentencing commissions and legislatures to apply in addressing real-offense sentencing.
H. WHAT ARE CHARGE- AND REAL-OFFENSE
SENTENCING AND WHY DOES THE CHOICE
BETWEEN THEM MATTER?
A.

DEFINING CHARGE- AND REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING

Charge-offense sentencing is the simpler of the two concepts. It refers to a court grounding its sentencing decisions on
the offense of conviction. 8 In an important sense, all sentencing
is charge-based because the statutory maximum applicable to
the defendant's offense of conviction establishes the outer limits
8. As this definition illustrates, charge-offense is something of a misnomer: conviction-offense sentencing is a more accurate description. Nonethe-

less, charge-offense sentencing will be used throughout this Article, because the
Sentencing Commission uses that terminology. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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of an allowable sentence. 9 Under a pure charge-offense system,
two defendants convicted of violating the same statute would receive the same sentence, without regard to any aggravating or
mitigating factors.
Charge-offense sentencing need not appear in such a pure
form. A modified charge-offense system might take into account
some factors other than the offense of conviction, such as the
defendant's criminal record. 10 Similarly, a sentencing decision
might be constrained, but not completely determined, by the offense of conviction. For example, mandatory minimum sentencing provisions, such as those now common in federal narcotics
law, are charge-oriented because they mandate a minimum sentence for defendants convicted of violating certain statutes."
These provisions do not represent pure charge-offense sentencing because the judge can impose a sentence above the
mandatory minimum term up to the statutory maximum.' 2 Any
sentencing rule requiring a particular decision or limiting the
9. See, e.g., United States v. Valente, 961 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that "when a statute requires a different sentence than that set by the
Sentencing Guidelines, the statute controls"); United States v. Rodriguez, 938
F.2d 319, 320 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Larotonda, 927 F.2d 697, 698
(2d Cir. 1991); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5G1.1 (providing that notwithstanding the applicable guideline range, the sentence imposed may be no
greater than that authorized by statute of conviction).
10. Minnesota's sentencing guidelines, which are essentially charge oriented, take into account the defendants criminal history, which, as in the Federal Guidelines, makes up the horizontal axis of the sentencing grid. See MINN.
SENTENCING COMM'N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § IV (1992) (Sentencing
Guidelines Grid). For a discussion of sentencing guidelines grids, see Marc

Miller, True Grid: Revealing Sentencing Policy, 25 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 587
(1992).

11. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING
TIES IN THE FEDERAL

COMMISSION, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALSYSTEM (1991) (criticizing the prolifera-

CRMINAL JUSTICE

tion of mandatory minimum penalties and noting the tension between such
penalties and sentencing guidelines); Michael Tonry, Mandatory Minimum

Penalties and the U.S. Sentencing Commission's "Mandatory Guidelines", 4
FED. SENTENCING REP. 129 (1991) (noting the similarities between the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes).
12. In addition, the judge can impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum only if the government files a motion indicating that the defendant has
provided "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another
person." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1988). The Guidelines contain a similar provision, authorizing a departure from the applicable guideline range based on the
government's substantial assistance motion. U.S.S.G., supra note 2, § 5K1.1.
This guideline has been controversial. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Lupkin, Note,
5K1.1 and SubstantialAssistance Departure: The Illusory Carrotof the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1519 (1991) (noting that the "[u]pon
motion of the government" clause has been interpreted as both a mechanical
provision and an advisory clause).
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sentencer's options based on the offense of conviction is a
"charge-offense element." "Charge-offense sentencing" refers to
any sentencing system that principally relies on charge-offense
elements.
Real-offense sentencing is a more elusive concept, without
widespread agreement on its meaning.' 3 The phrase itself is
something of a misnomer, suggesting simply an attempt to discover the true nature of the offense committed by the defendant.14 A broader definition is appropriate, however, because the
concerns raised by real-offense sentencing relate to a judge's reliance on any fact not necessary for conviction. Therefore, for
purposes of this Article, real-offense sentencing is the antithesis
of charge-offense sentencing. A "pure" real-offense system
would be one that considered the entirety of the defendant's life,
an almost limitless undertaking. 15 While the statute of conviction determines or constrains a charge-offense element, a "realoffense element" is any sentencing factor not included in the definition of the offense of conviction and either established at trial
or admitted by the defendant as part of a guilty plea. This Article uses the phrase "real-offense sentencing" to refer to any system incorporating real-offense elements to a significant extent.
With this general definition in place, one can identify the
wide variety of real-offense elements and group them into meanMandatory minimum statutes may deviate from charge-offense sentencing
in other ways as well, such as by having facts necessary to their applicability
determined at sentencing, rather than as elements of the offense. See infra
note 17.
13. The Guidelines refer to a real-offense system as one in which the sentence is based "upon the actual conduct in which the defendant engaged regardless of the charges for which he was indicted or convicted." U.S.S.G., supra note
1, § 1A4.a; see also Kevin R. Reitz, SentencingFacts: Travesties ofReal-Offense
Sentencing, 45 STAN.L. REv. 523, 526 n.15 (1992) (noting different definitions of
real-offense).
14. Few would advocate sentencing the defendant for something other than
his or her "real" offense. The phrase "real offense sentencing" suggests an aura
of inevitability and unquestionable propriety, thereby masking the debatable
assumptions underlying the practice of looking beyond the offense of conviction
in determining the sentence. For a discussion of the way in which the use of
language can affect and limit critical analysis of phenomena, see HERBERT M.ARONE-DnmNSIONAL MAN 84 -120 (1964).
15. See L. WINs ET AL., SENTENCING GuInEUNES: STRUCTURING JUDIcIAL DismCRION 15 (1978) ("Since human beings are capable of a virtually infinite variety of behaviors, the amount of information available about such
behavior is also nearly infinite."); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1988) ("No limitation
shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and
conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence.").
CUSE,
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ingful categories. A helpful starting point is to recognize that
virtually all relevant sentencing information either pertains to
the offense or to the offender. Although this is by no means the
only possible analytical framework,1 6 and does not account for
all possible sentencing information, 17 it will facilitate understanding the Sentencing Commission's approach and assessing
the merits of taking into consideration any particular real-offense element at sentencing.
Offense information enables the sentencing judge to make a
more complete assessment of the case by looking beyond the
mere elements of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. The general type of such information, offense characteristics, are aggravating or mitigating factors concerning the
offense of conviction. Offense characteristics can be either criminal or noncriminal in nature, depending upon whether they
constitute separate criminal offenses.
Noncriminal offense characteristics do not constitute separate offenses. For example, in a fraud case the sentence might
be affected by the amount of the fraud. A typical fraud statute
does not make the amount of gain or loss an element of the offense, nor does a large fraud expose the offender to more charges
or a harsher statutory maximum penalty than does a small
fraud.' 8 Another example of a noncriminal offense characteristic a court might consider is the role the defendant played in the
offense.
Criminal offense characteristics, in contrast, are facts concerning the offense of conviction that could result in a prosecution for a separate criminal offense. 19 If a bank robber uses a
gun and injures a teller, these facts can be seen as aggravating
factors to the offense of conviction (robbery), but they may also
expose the defendant to prosecution for additional offenses (as20
sault, weapons possession).
16. For a somewhat different analytical structure, see Reitz, supra note 13,
at 527, 535.
17. A sentencer interested in maximizing general deterrence might, for example, take into account an increasing occurrence rate for the type of crime
committed by the defendant. This information concerns neither the offender,
nor the manner in which the offense was committed.
18. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341-1344 (1988).
19. Michael Tonry and John Coffee have referred to these as "legally recognized" facts. Michael Tonry & John C. Coffee, Jr., EnforcingSentencing Guidelines: Plea Bargaining and Review Mechanisms, in THE SENTNCING
COMMSSION AND rrs GUIDELINES 142, 155 (1987).

20. The principal federal drug mandatory minimum statute, § 841(b) of Tite 21, incorporates offense characteristic sentencing by basing the applicable
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One could also extend the concept of offense characteristics
to include the defendant's acts in preparation for the offense of
conviction, or in its immediate aftermath, that manifest the seriousness of the offense. For example, a judge or sentencing commission might view as aggravating factors the defendant's
extensive planning activity prior to the offense, the defendant's
theft of a car to aid in a robbery, or the defendant's taking of a
hostage or driving recklessly while escaping from the offense.
These factors, like all offense characteristics, can be either criminal or noncriminal in nature.
Another type of offense information, which this Article refers to as "alleged more-serious-offense" information, might be
used by a court to sentence defendants based upon a more serious offense that the court believes the defendant actually committed.2 1 For example, a judge might believe that a defendant
who pleaded guilty to, or was convicted of, simple possession of
narcotics actually was guilty of possession with the intent to distribute, and sentence the defendant on that basis. The defend22
ant may have been acquitted of that more serious offense, it
mandatory term on the drug quantity involved in the offense, an amount that
courts have held is not an element of the offense, but a fact to be determined at
sentencing. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988); see, e.g., United States v. Hodges,
935 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 251 (1991) and 112
S.Ct. 317 (1991); United States v. McNeese, 901 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Wood, 834 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. Ruv. 199,
205 (1993) ("To date, the courts have uniformly held that the drug quantities
specified in section 841(b) are not elements of the offense but solely sentencing
factors to be considered by the judge.").
21. The meaning of a "more-serious" offense is not self-evident. It might
mean an offense with a higher statutory maximum, an offense for which the
applicable guideline range is more serious, or simply an offense which the judge
believes calls for a harsher sentence than the offense of conviction.
22. Despite the overtones of double jeopardy, most courts have sanctioned
the consideration at sentencing of alleged conduct for which the defendant has
been acquitted. This is because an "[a]cquittal does not have the effect of conclusively establishing the untruth of all the evidence introduced against [a] defendant." United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 1972). In addition,
the government may still prove the alleged crime by the lower preponderance of
the evidence standard generally applicable at sentencing. United States v. Lee,
818 F.2d 1052, 1057 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 956 (1987); see also Reitz,
supra note 13, at 531 n.49 (citing and discussing such cases). But see, United
States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991) (arguing that "we would pervert our system ofjustice if we allowed a defendant to suffer punishment for a
criminal charge for which he or she was acquitted"); Reitz, supra note 13, at
533 n.63 (noting that several state courts refuse to allow acquitted conduct to be
considered).
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may never have been charged, or the more serious charge may
have been dropped as part of a plea bargain.
There is a wide spectrum of offender information that might
be relevant to sentencing. Sentencing courts have traditionally
considered a variety of offender characteristicsconcerning the
defendant's background, such as the defendant's age, employment history, drug or alcohol use, and family or community
ties.2 3 A court could also consider the defendant's prior record of
criminal convictions 24 and alleged prior criminal conduct not
leading to convictions.
In addition, a court might be interested in the defendant's
conduct subsequent to the offense of conviction. The defendant
may have attempted to avoid detection or responsibility for the
offense by, for example, obstructing the investigation or committing peijury at trial. The defendant's contrition or willingness to
plead guilty also traditionally have had a significant impact on
the sentence. 25 This type of behavior is best labelled offender,
rather than offense, information. This is because if such information is relevant to sentencing,2 6 it is not because it reveals
anything about the offense of conviction, but rather because it
sheds light on the defendant's character or culpability.
Finally we come to that category of information referred to
herein as alleged related-offense sentencing. In addition to the
offense of conviction, a judge might consider offenses that the
defendant allegedly committed which are related in some way to
the offense of conviction, but for which the defendant was not
convicted. A defendant convicted of one robbery or drug sale
might be sentenced based on several other contemporaneous
robberies or drug sales which the court believes the defendant to
have committed. Similar to alleged more-serious-offenses, the
defendant may not have been charged with the additional offenses, charges may have been dropped as part of a plea bargain,
or the defendant may have been acquitted 27 of such charges.
Some might argue that alleged related-offenses should be
regarded as a species of offense, not offender, information. It is
more useful and accurate, however, to classify an alleged re23. See, e.g., WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE-COLLAR CmIuALs 102-08 (1988).
24. This is the one real-offense category that is based on facts that have
been proved in a criminal trial or that the defendant has admitted as part of a
guilty plea.
25. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 23, at 115-18.
26. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 22.
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lated-offense as offender information. An alleged related-offense
is really part of the defendant's alleged criminal history. The
fact that an alleged offense bears a relationship to the offense of
conviction does not convert it into information about the offense
of which the defendant was convicted. In this sense an alleged
related-offense differs from an alleged more-serious-offense or a
criminal offense characteristic, both of which are offense facts
because they do not require an examination of facts beyond the
incident leading to the defendant's conviction. Ultimately, labelling alleged related-offenses as either offense or offender information is somewhat arbitrary and does not answer the central
question of whether this information should play a role in determining the sentence.
B.

Tim

SIGNIFICANCE OF CHOOsING BETWEEN CHARGE- AND
REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING

A complex web of factors confronts a sentencing commission
in deciding whether to rely on a charge-offense oriented approach, or to incorporate some or many real-offense elements. A
fundamental starting point is to settle upon the purpose or purposes to be served at sentencing. 28 Real-offense elements do not
have an intrinsically valid function at sentencing. Their utility
depends upon the sentencing philosophy they are designed to
serve. Some real-offense elements may play important roles in a
variety of sentencing rationales, while others that are central
under one doctrine may be largely irrelevant under another.
For example, the defendant's criminal history will likely matter
less, if at all, in a system guided by just deserts than in a system
embracing a utilitarian principle such as deterrence or incapacitation.2 9 A coherent approach to narrowing the broad range of
possible sentencing information first requires articulating a sentencing rationale.
The importance of the distinction between real- and chargeoffense sentencing becomes more apparent when one considers
the goals of sentencing reform. One of the primary aims of recent sentencing reform efforts, including the Federal Sentencing
28. An extended discussion of the purposes at sentencing is beyond the
scope of this article. For a more in-depth discussion of such purposes, see Marc
Miller, PurposesAt Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413 (1992).
29. In general, a retributivist will focus much more heavily on offense facts,
while a utilitarian will also be quite interested in offender characteristics. See,
e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIuMINAL LAw 460-66 (1978); RICHARD G.
SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT ch. 5
(1979).
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Reform Act of 1984,30 has been the reduction of unwarranted
disparity. 3 ' To reduce unwarranted disparity, reformers must
increase uniformity and proportionality. 3 2 That is, sentencing
guidelines should impose comparable sentences on similar offenders committing similar offenses, while imposing appropriately different punishmnent on criminal conduct of varying
severity. A successful sentencing reform effort should seek to
maximize both uniformity and proportionality. The difficulty of
this task is reflected in the characteristics of charge- and realoffense sentencing.
Charge-offense sentencing, in theory, fosters uniformity and
consistency. Grounding the sentence in the offense of conviction
limits the factors that make up a sentencing decision and eliminates the need for complex or time-consuming sentencing procedures, which may inhibit uniformity by straining judicial
resources and inviting error.
Uniformity, however, can come at the expense of proportionality. Imposing the same sentence on all convicted defendants,
regardless of the nature of the offense and the offender, achieves
perfect uniformity, but is bizarrely disproportional. 33 Charge30. Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1987 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988)).
31. Avoiding or reducing unwarranted disparity was one of the principle
goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1988);
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
32. Disparity is sometimes defined in the limited sense of similar cases receiving different sentences. See Ilene H. Nagel, StructuringSentencingDiscretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CFnn. L. & CRImNOLOGY
883, 933 (1990) ("The term disparity, in the sentencing context, is generally
used to refer to a pattern of unlike sentences for like offenders.") (citation omitted). Efforts to achieve uniformity address this form of disparity by seeking to
impose roughly equivalent sentences in similar cases. This is only half of the
equation, though, because the comprehensive goal of sentencing reform is to
ensure that most cases receive appropriate sentences. To attain this goal it is
equally important that cases of differing severity receive appropriately different
sentences. Thus, a more sophisticated approach to disparity is concerned with
proportionality, as well as uniformity. See id. at 932-35; Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: UnacceptableLimits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1704 (1992) ("An essential component of
solving the problem of unwarranted disparity lies in distinguishing between
like cases, which ought to be sentenced similarly, and unlike cases, which ought
to be sentenced in proportion to their greater or lesser seriousness."); see also
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the FederalSentencing Process: The Problem
is Uniformity, Not Disparity,29 AM. Cmm. L. REv. 833 (1992) (concluding that
undue uniformity, not excessive disparity, is an important current problem).
33. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1A3 ("Simple uniformity - sentencing
every offender to five years - destroys proportionality."); see also Albert W. Al-
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offense sentencing fails to account for the large variations in
conduct and culpability possible among offenders who have violated the same statute.3 4 Legislators tend to draw criminal statutes broadly, without detailed categories or distinctions based
on harm or culpability. Many of the factors that influence sentencing decisions are not elements of the offense. For example,
Judge Stephen Breyer, an original member of the United States
Sentencing Commission and a principal architect of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, wrote the following:
A bank robber, for example, might, or might not, use a gun; he might
take a little, or a lot, of money; he might, or might not, injure the teller.
The typical armed robbery statute, however, does not distinguish
among these different ways of committing the crime. Nor does such a
statute necessarily distinguish between how cruelly the defendant
treated the victims, whether the victims were especially vulnerable as
age, or whether the defendant, though guilty, acted
a result of their
35
under duress.

A charge-offense system, therefore, may violate the principle of
proportionality by "overaggregating" or treating dissimilar offenders alike.
According to conventional wisdom, a second shortcoming of
charge-offense oriented sentencing is that it shifts sentencing
discretion to the prosecutor.3 6 Because the prosecutor selects
the charges and the judge fixes the sentence according to the
offense of conviction, charge-offense sentencing enables the
prosecutor to determine, or at least predict with great accuracy,
whether a defendant will receive a short or long sentence if convicted or whether two similarly situated defendants will receive
uniform or disparate sentences. Such heightened prosecutorial
power is disturbing for several reasons. First, prosecutors are
interested advocates in the criminal justice system, a position
that seems incompatible with the sentencing function. In addischuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less Aggregation, 58
U. CHI. L. REv. 901, 916 (1991) (commenting that sentencing all offenders alike
would not conform to most understandings of equal justice).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1099 n.15 (3d Cir.
1990) (opining that "it is self-evident that an internationally trained terrorist
who is bent on murdering scores of innocent civilians should be sentenced far
more severely than a duly licensed explosives merchant who knows that one of
his customers intends to blow up an abandoned warehouse in order to commit
insurance fraud, even if each of these defendants is convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(d) for transporting explosives 'with the knowledge or intent that [they]
will be used to kill... any individual or unlawfully to... destroy any building").
35. Breyer, supra note 4, at 9-10.
36. See, e.g., Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1562 (arguing that "if
guidelines prescribe specific offenses, the power to initiate or dismiss charges is
the power to determine sentence").
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tion, because the prosecutor's charging decision is essentially
unreviewable, 37 this intensified authority may be used arbitrarily, in order to coerce guilty pleas or reward favored defendants.
Finally, this increased prosecutorial power can greatly undercut
a charge-offense system's supposed gains in promoting uniformity. If the prosecutor can determine the sentence by selecting
the charge, sentencing guidelines can be manipulated or circumvented. This can reintroduce disparity, because factors other
than neutral characteristics of the offense and the offender may
come into play.
Advocates of real-offense sentencing contend that it avoids
these serious drawbacks of charge-offense sentencing.38 They
argue that by taking into consideration all of the facts relevant
to the offense and the offender, a real-offense sentence will more
fully reflect the defendant's true culpability, furthering proportionality. A real-offense system will also diminish the prosecu39
tor's role in sentencing and the impact of plea bargaining.
Because the judge bases the sentence on the defendant's "real"
conduct, regardless of the offense of conviction, the prosecutor's
actions have only a limited effect on the sentence. This reduces
unwarranted disparity by ensuring that similar defendants receive similar sentences regardless of the prosecutor's charging
and bargaining decisions.
Objections to real-offense sentencing generally fall into two
categories: fairness and effectiveness. 40 Critics contend that
real-offense sentencing is manifestly unfair,4 ' if not unconstitu37. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (indicating that "whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion").
38. For summaries and critical discussions of the arguments in favor of
real-offense sentencing, see Reitz, supra note 13, at 553-65; Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 757-72 (1980);
Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 152-63.
39. See MODEL AcT, supra note 6, § 3-206(d) cmt. (stating that real-offense
sentencing is designed "to reduce the impact of plea bargaining on the sentencing process").
40. See Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1564 ("The fundamental flaws
of real offense sentencing are easily stated. The most basic are that it is incompatible with the basic values of our legal system and that it will not work.");
Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 152-163.
41. See Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1564-69 (arguing that real
offense sentencing undermines the importance of the substantive criminal law,
nullifies the law of evidence, and conflicts with the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt). Recently, Kevin Reitz has made a forceful case against
real offense sentencing on fairness grounds. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 54765; see also, Stephen J. Schulhofer, supra note 38, 765-68 (1980) (opining that
"a sentencing system that permits conflicting policies to be pursued by in-
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tional. 42 Defendants in such a regime are sentenced based on
facts not proved at trial or admitted as part of a guilty plea. Indeed, the sentence may be aggravated based on conduct for
which the defendant has been acquitted. 43 The sentencing judge
may have found these sentencing facts by a mere preponderance
of the evidence, without many of the procedural protections applicable to determinations of guilt or innocence. The defendant
may be deprived of the anticipated benefit of a plea agreement,
44
as dismissed charges are reintroduced at the sentencing stage.
This sacrifice of fairness is particularly hard to justify if a
real-offense system fails even to achieve its stated aims. Critics
suggest that the promise of real-offense sentencing is illusory
because such a system is unworkable. 45 Real-offense sentencing
dependent authorities, prosecutors on the one hand and sentencing or parole
officials on the other, seems vulnerable to multiple constitutional objections").
42. See, e.g., Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1577-80 (arguing that
real-offense sentencing under the Model Act is probably unconstitutional).
Real-offense sentencing has a long history of acceptance by the courts. See,
e.g., McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process requirements for consideration of real-offense evidence in sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241
(1949) (upholding sentencing court's reliance on a variety of real offense elements). Some commentators have argued that because of the changed nature of
sentencing in the era of sentencing guidelines, Williams and McMillan are of
limited precedential value, and real-offense sentencing may, in fact, be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing:
No End to Disparity, 28 AM. Cium. L. REv. 161, 210-20 (1991); Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged The Dog: Bifurcated Factfinding Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines And The Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REv.
289, 311-14, 337-39 (1992); Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1179, 1208-18 (1993); Richard Husseini, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the
Burden of Proof,57 U. Cm. L. Rv. 1387, 1399-1406 (1990) (arguing that the
preponderance-of-evidence standard for real-offense determinations may be unconstitutional). But see Reitz, supra note 13, at 542-46 (suggesting that the
Supreme Court is likely to continue to apply Williams and McMillan).
The courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines'
real-offense provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899
F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990) (rejecting due process
and double jeopardy challenges); Lear, supra, at 1208-18. The courts have also
continued to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 182. But see United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d
1084, 1100-01 (3d Cir. 1990) (requiring at least clear and convincing evidence to
support 22-level upward departure).
43. See supra note 22.
44. Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at 1575-77 ("Real offense sentencing
would involve a form of misrepresentation that would not be tolerated in most
marketplaces.").
45. For a discussion of the tension between the need for workability and
the value of complexity in a comprehensive sentencing system, see Paul H.
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can easily lead to unmanageable complexity as judges must determine all of the "real" facts relevant to sentencing. Errors in
the application of complex sentencing rules can reintroduce disparity. Prosecutors and defense attorneys may "circumvent the
guidelines by developing new plea bargaining patterns."46 Realoffense sentencing also depends upon the judge receiving complete and accurate information concerning the offense and the
offender. Accordingly, a real-offense system is vulnerable to inadequate information gathering, which may be caused by a lack
of resources or a willingness by the parties to "hide" facts from
the court. If the impact of plea bargaining is in fact severely
more defendrestricted, the system may be paralyzed if many
47
ants opt to go to trial, rather than plead guilty.
In sum, the choice between real- and charge-offense sentencing is difficult and perplexing. In theory, each system furthers some of the goals of sentencing reform, but inhibits others.
Moreover, serious questions persist about the gap between the
theory and the reality of each approach.

C. TiE ROLE OF REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING IN NONGUIDELINE SENTENCING SYSTEMS

Real-offense sentencing is not a creation of the Sentencing
Commission. It has long been a part of traditional American
sentencing systems, such as the federal regime that existed
before the introduction of the Guidelines. 48 This fact has led
some to suggest that the Sentencing Commission's adoption of
real-offense sentencing simply formalizes the pre-existing judicial approach to sentencing.4 9 This argument is misleading and
Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 Tax L. REv. 1, 10-12

(1987); see also Ronald F. Wright, Complexity and Distrust in Sentencing
Guidelines, 25 U.C. DAvis L. Rav. 617 (1992) (arguing that the Guidelines' complexity may be a necessary evil, and that simplification must be approached
cautiously).
46. Tonry, supra note 6, at 1570; see also id. at 1571-73 (suggesting other
ways parties may circumvent real-offense guidelines).
47. Id. at 1570.
48.

See generally Schulhofer, supra note 38, at 765-68.

49. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989)
(interpreting "Guideline § 1B1.3 to require courts to take account of'relevant
conduct' - conduct that, very roughly speaking, corresponds to those actions
and circumstances that courts typically took into account when sentencing prior
to the Guidelines' enactment."); Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 516 (stating
that the Sentencing Commission's decision to include in the Guidelines offenses
for which defendant was not convicted "simply formalizes the pre-Guidelines
practice of considering the full range of a defendant's conduct for sentencing
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understates the radical nature of the Sentencing Commission's
compromise.
Federal sentencing before the Guidelines, like the systems
that continue to exist in many states,50 is best described as incorporating discretionary or permissive real-offense sentencing.
One of the defining features of the pre-Guidelines federal system
was that judges exercised largely unfettered discretion in selecting a punishment within broad statutory limits. 5 ' This discretion extended to deciding which, if any, real-offense elements
would be considered. 52 Most judges believed in at least some aspects of real-offense sentencing and ordinarily tried to base the
sentence on a complete picture of the defendant, the crimes he or
and any relevant aggravating or mitigating
she had committed,
53
circumstances.
It is important to note the limited nature of this real-offense
sentencing. A judge in the former federal system was not required to take into account any real-offense behavior, as would
be the case with binding sentencing guidelines incorporating
real-offense sentencing. One judge might opt for a charge-offense approach by imposing five years imprisonment on all bank
robbers, while another might consider the circumstances of the
case or the defendant's background and record. Judges who
agreed on the relevance of certain real-offense elements might
not agree on the weight to be given such factors. The impact of
real-offense elements was also not rigid and predetermined. A
judge inclined to consider a real-offense fact might "discount"
that fact depending upon the apparent strength of the government's evidence, or the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty.
Further, individual judges did not necessarily rely on the same
purposes, regardless of whether all of such criminal activity was encompassed
within counts of conviction").
50. For a partial survey of real-offense practices in the states, see Reitz,
supra note 13, at 528 n.22.
51. For background on the history of American sentencing practices up to
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see Nagel, supra note 32, at 887-99.
52. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 528 (indicating that "nearly every state
allows sentencing courts to engage freely in real-offense sentencing as a matter
of discretion").
53. The authors of a thoughtful study on the sentencing of white collar offenders found that most judges believe to some extent in real-offense sentencing. See, WHEELER Er AL., supra note 23, at 17-18, 30-36. For example, one
judge acknowledged to the authors being interested in "the total picture of what
was going on, not in the slice selected by the prosecution for inclusion in the
indictment." Id. at 17; see also Schulhofer, supra note 38, at 757 (stating that
available evidence suggests that judges rely on real-offense sentencing).
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types of real-offense elements, or give them the same weight,
54
from case to case.
Real-offense sentencing was therefore sporadic and unpredictable. It was also part and parcel of an offender-based, rehabilitative-oriented penology that was largely rejected by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Guidelines. 55 Real-offense sentencing's apparently secure place in the pre-Guidelines
world does not necessarily justify mandatory real-offense guidelines. Far from being a simple formalization of past practice, the
Sentencing Commission's version of real-offense sentencing,
which incorporates criminal offense characteristics 5 6 as well as
alleged more-serious-offenses 57 and alleged related-offenses, 58 is
a radical measure which reaches far beyond any state guideline
system. 59
D.

PLEA BARGAINNG AND REAL-OFFENSE SENTENCING

The reality of plea bargaining exerts a powerful influence on
the conflict between real- and charge-offense sentencing. A significant part of the appeal of real-offense sentencing is its potential to minimize the impact of plea bargaining on sentencing. 60
A real-offense system, however, is itself vulnerable to manipulative plea bargaining. 61 This is true in part because, in many respects, there exists a fundamental tension between plea
bargaining and sentencing guidelines. The parties engaged in
plea bargaining do not share sentencing reformers' goal of reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity. Prosecutors ordinarily care less about disparity than with obtaining a conviction
and a generally satisfactory sentence. 62 The defendant does not
54. This ability to dispense with real-offense sentencing appears to have
played a major role in shaping plea bargaining in the pre-Guidelines federal
criminal justice system. See infra part H.D.
55. Commentators also argue that the shift from a discretionary to a
mandatory real-offense system, in combination with the shift away from offender-based sentencing undermines the constitutional legitimacy of the Guidelines' structure. See Herman, supra note 42, at 301-304.
56. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 111-140 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 141, 224, 244, 258.
60. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM.

Ciun. L. lv. 231, 283 (1989) (interview data suggests that one reason prosecutors have sometimes agreed to manipulate Guidelines through plea bargaining
is that they "focused upon maximizing their conviction rate, but were not ori-
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care at all about disparity. In fact, in a sense the defendant actively seeks disparity, because his or her aim is to receive a
lighter sentence than that imposed on similarly situated offenders. A sentencing guideline system that is serious about reducing unwarranted disparity must therefore attempt to regulate
and control plea bargaining.
The utility of plea bargaining depends in large part upon
the value of the inducement the prosecutor can offer a defendant
for pleading guilty. The more the defendant stands to gain, the
more likely he or she will be to enter a guilty plea. 63 Similarly,

the more the prosecutor has to offer the defendant, the more authority the prosecutor has to encourage a guilty plea and influence the sentence. A powerful inducement for charge
bargaining, 64 historically the main form of bargaining in the federal system, exists in a charge-offense system, and the inducement theoretically diminishes the more the system becomes
real-offense oriented. In a pure charge-offense system, the offense of conviction determines the sentence. In such a system
charge bargaining is extremely attractive to the defendant because a guilty plea can result in a significant reduction in the
sentence applicable to a conviction on the dropped charges. The
prosecutor, in turn, acquires a great deal of power to convince
the defendant to plead guilty, because by dropping or reducing
charges, the prosecutor can effectively determine the ultimate
65
sentence.
ented toward maximizing the severity of the sentences they obtained.... National uniformity, certainty or reduced disparity are not goals which they
embrace.").
63. See Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 146-52 (discussing guidelines'
effect on plea bargaining in terms of available inducements and defendants' toleration of risk).
64. Charge bargaining occurs when the defendant agrees to plead guilty to
either fewer counts or less serious charges than the prosecutor has brought
against the defendant. Thus the bargaining concerns the counts to which a defendant pleads, not the ultimate sentence. Sentence bargaining, in contrast,
concerns the ultimate sentence, and is designed to result in a sentence agreement that is binding if the judge accepts the agreement, or a sentence recommendation by the prosecutor that does not bind the judge.
65. Some commentators suggest that the power of the entire plea bargaining process, not just the power of the prosecutor, is enhanced in a charge-offense system. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 562. Nonetheless, the result is
increased pressure on the defendant to plea guilty, a situation of which the
prosecutor can take advantage. See Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 146-47;
see also Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and ProsecutorialPower: A
Critique of Recent Proposalsfor "Fixed"and "Presumptive"Sentencing, 126 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 550 (1978) (arguing that reform is likely to produce a system comparable to the current sentencing regime, in which discretion is concentrated in
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In contrast, the formal offense of conviction only determines
the statutory maximum sentence in a real-offense system. Beyond that limitation, the judge bases the sentence on the defendant's actual conduct, however that is defined, regardless of the
offense of conviction. Charge bargaining may therefore be of little use in a real-offense system because the presumptive sentence may not be significantly affected by the dismissal of
counts. If true, this fact significantly reduces the prosecutor's
ability to encourage guilty pleas, and to influence or determine
the sentence, in a real-offense system.
It is appropriate to consider why charge bargaining was
widely used in the pre-Guidelines federal system, with its permissive real-offense character. At first blush, it might seem that
charge bargaining would not be a useful device in such a system,
because a reduction in charges would not necessarily affect the
judge's decision. Nevertheless, the parties shared an expectation that if the prosecution dropped counts in exchange for a
guilty plea, the defendant would receive a lesser sentence than
might otherwise be imposed. What seems to account for that
perception, which was by and large an accurate one, 66 is that in
a variety of ways the parties were able to introduce charge-offense aspects into the sentencing process. It is important to remember that although federal judges had the freedom to use
real-offense information in imposing sentences, they were not
required to do so. 6 7 Thus if the judge agreed, explicitly or tacitly, to ignore or give diminished attention to dropped counts, a
charge bargain could accomplish a great deal. This seems to
have gone on, although the parties were almost always uncertain about what the value of the plea would be. 68 Furthermore,
the parties were able to add a charge-offense aspect by withholdthe prosecutor's office, and in which the benefits of this discretion are made
available only to defendants who sacrifice their constitutional rights).
66. The Sentencing Commission's studies revealed that before the Guidelines, defendants who pleaded guilty received, on average, sentences thirty to
forty percent lower than defendants who were convicted at trial. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SuPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDE-

LINES

AND

POLICY

STATEMENTS

48 (1987) [hereinafter

COMMISSION,

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT).

67. See supra part 11.C.
68. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
LINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND

GUIDESHORTTERM IMPACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND PLEA BARGAINING
COMMISSION, OPERATION REPORT].

389-90 (1991) [hereinafter
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ing relevant information from the judge. 6 9 As long as the information upon which the judge based the sentence came primarily
from the government, the prosecutor's willingness not to draw
the judge's attention to aggravating factors would contribute (albeit, again, to an unknowable extent) to a lesser sentence.
Charge bargaining, although a hidden and uncertain process, seems to have been able to take advantage of the flexible
nature of the old system. This suggests that real-offense systems remain vulnerable to the effects of plea bargaining. As this
article discusses later, the workings of this process have important implications for charge bargaining under the Guidelines,
with its real-offense aspects designed to limit the impact of plea
bargaining.
III. WHAT THE SENTENCING COMMISSION DID
Faced with the necessity of attempting to resolve the conflict between "procedural and substantive fairness" 70 posed by
charge- and real-offense sentencing, and given little or no statutory guidance, 7 ' the Sentencing Commission understandably
chose neither extreme, opting instead for a middle course. After
initially considering guidelines that were very much real-offense
oriented,7 2 the Sentencing Commission settled on a system that,
69. See COMMISSION, SuPPLEmNTARY REPORT, supra note 66, at 48 (arguing that "anecdotal evidence indicates that the parties may sometimes also
agree to suppress relevant facts, thereby making a lower sentence likely").
70. Breyer, supra note 4, at 9.
71. See, e.g., Nagel, supra,note 31, at 913 (indicating that Congress left the
choice between real- and charge-offense system to the Sentencing Commission);
Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 501 (noting that the House of Representatives
version of sentencing reform rejected real-offense sentencing except in some
plea-bargaining arrangements, while the Senate version, which ultimately became the Sentencing Reform Act, "did not expressly specify, [but] seemed to
lean toward a real offense system").
A panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals initially ruled that the
Guidelines' real-offense provisions exceeded the Sentencing Commission's authority under the Sentencing Reform Act. United States v. Galloway, 943 F.2d
897, 899-905 (8th Cir. 1991). The Eighth Circuit, en banc, later reversed this
decision. United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414 (1992) cert. denied, 113 S.Ct.
1420 (1993).

72. The Sentencing Commission published, and received public comment
on, two draft versions of guidelines prior to promulgating the final guidelines in
April 1987. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, PRELIMINARY DRAFT SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1986); U.S. SENTENCING CoMMIssIoN, REVISED DRAFT SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1987). The 1986 draft was more real-offense oriented

than the final guidelines, while the 1987 draft was more charge-offense oriented. For a discussion of the process of drafting the Guidelines see Nagel,
supra note 32, at 914-25.
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according to Judge Breyer, reflects an attempt to "have some
real- elements, but not so many that it becomes unwieldy or pro7
cedurally unfair." 3
The following sections describe the nature and extent of the
Guidelines' incorporation of real-offense elements. Before proceeding, however, it is important to note what the Sentencing
Commission did not do. It did not base its decisions about the
appropriate scope of sentencing information, or any other important decision, on a view of the goals at sentencing. The Sentencing Commission expressly declined to choose between, or
attempt to synthesize, just deserts and crime control philosophies, claiming the following:
A clear-cut Commission decision in favor of one of these approaches
would diminish the chance that the guidelines would find the widespread acceptance they need for effective implementation. As a practical matter, in most sentencing decisions both philosophies may prove
consistent with the same result. 74

This decision, for which the Sentencing Commission has been
severely criticized, 75 makes it unduly difficult to discern the reasons why the Commission accepted or rejected any particular
real-offense element.

A. OFFENSE INFORMATION
1.

Offense Characteristics

The Guidelines rely extensively on offense characteristics.
This policy is manifested in the "specific offense characteristics"
applicable to individual offense guidelines, and the "adjustments" in Chapter Three of the Guidelines, which are applicable
to all offenses. 76 Specific offense characteristics and adjustments are aggravating, or occasionally, mitigating factors to the
offense. They are not generally elements of the offense and consequently they are not admitted as part of a guilty plea nor must
the prosecutor prove them at trial. The Guidelines draw no
distinction between criminal and noncriminal offense
characteristics.
73. Breyer, supra note 4, at 11.
74. U.S. SENTENCING COmMssIoN, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(3) (1989 edition). The Sentencing Commission subsequently
deleted this language. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, amend. 307.
75. See Miller, supra note 28, at 437-50; Andrew von Hirsch, FederalSentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 AM. Cnm . L.
Ruv. 367, 370-73 (1989).
76. Section 1BI.1 sets forth the instructions for applying the Guidelines.
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.1.
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Examples of offense characteristics include: the amount of
77
money a defendant convicted of embezzlement received,
whether that defendant engaged in more than minimal planning, 78 whether a defendant convicted of a narcotics offense possessed a dangerous weapon, 79 or whether a money launderer
knew or believed that the funds laundered were the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity.80 Significant adjustments include
whether the defendant selected a particularly vulnerable victim,"' or whether the defendant had an aggravating 2 or mitigating8 3 role in the offense.
In an attempt to control the level of complexity in the
Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission did not seek to identify
and include every possible aggravating and mitigating factor;
rather, the Guidelines include only those factors that, based on
the Commission's study of past cases,8 4 occur with some frequency. 5 The Guidelines recommend that judges consider unusual aggravating and mitigating factors, like a death8 resulting
7
from the offense,8 6 by departing from the Guidelines.
77. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
78. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(5).
79. Id. § 2Dl.1(b)(1).
80. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2Sl.1(b)(1).
81. Id. § 3A1.1.
82. Id. § 3B1.l.
83. Id. § 3B1.2.
84. The Sentencing Commission's use of data concerning past sentencing
practice is discussed in Nagel, supra note 32, at 927-32. Commissioner Paul
Robinson criticized this reliance in his dissent from the Guidelines. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, DISSENTING VIEW OF COMMISSIONER PAUL H. ROBINSON ON THE PROMULGATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES BY THE UNITED STATES

SENTENCING COMISSION 4-6 (1987).
85. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 32, at 923 (stating that specific offense characteristics were determined in part by "empirical analysis of past sentencing
practices [which] showed that judges routinely distinguished one offender convicted of the base offense from another on the basis of such a characteristic").
86. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K2.1 ("If death resulted, the court may
increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range.").
87. Departures from the Guidelines are governed by § 3553(b) of Title 18,
which authorizes a departure sentence if "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see also U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K2.0. For a useful
analysis of the evolving case law concerning departures from the Guidelines,
see Bruce M. Selya & Matthew R. Kipp, An Examination of Emerging Departure JurisprudenceUnder the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1 (1991).
Commissioner Paul Robinson argued in his dissent from the Guidelines
that by inviting departures rather than incorporating all relevant sentencing
factors into the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission violated its statutory
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2. Alleged More-Serious-Offenses
Application of the Guidelines begins with the offense of conviction, which determines the applicable offense guideline, including the base offense level and the potential list of specific
offense characteristics.8 8 The court is not free to unilaterally determine that because the defendant actually committed an offense more serious than the offense of conviction, a different,
more severe guideline should apply.8 9 Although this would appear to represent a rejection of alleged more-serious-offense
real-offense sentencing, such a characterization of the Guidelines is somewhat misleading. There is an exception to the general rule that states that "in the case of a plea agreement
containing a stipulation that specifically establishes a more-serious-offense than the offense of conviction," the court is to apply
the guideline applicable to the stipulated offense. 90 The parties
can, in effect, stipulate that the court should sentence the defendant based on a more-serious-offense than the offense of
conviction.9 1
mandate and invited disparity. See Robinson, supra note 84, at 13-16; see also,
Robinson, supra note 45, at 15-16 (arguing that a system that only mandates a
few factors and gives judges substantial discretion will suffer from the same
sentence disparity that prompted the current movement toward sentencing
reform).
88. Section 1B1.2(a) directs the court to select the offense guideline from
Chapter Two that is "most applicable to the offense of conviction (i.e., the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or information of which
the defendant was convicted)." U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § IB1.2(a). A Statutory
Index assists the judge in selecting the appropriate guideline, but if more than
one guideline is referenced in the Statutory Index, or ifthe referenced guideline
does not adequately describe the conduct for which the defendant was convicted, § 1B1.2(a) requires the court to select the most appropriate guideline.
Id. § 1B1.2(a) app. A; see, e.g., United States v. Obiuwevbi, 962 F.2d 1236, 1242
(7th Cir. 1992) (defendant convicted of making false statements properly sentenced under guideline for currency reporting crime rather than fraud guideline
ordinarily applicable to false statements statute); United States v. Beard, 913
F.2d 193, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant properly sentenced under fraud and
deceit guideline rather than pejury guideline for making false statement under
penalty of peijury in bankruptcy proceeding); THomAs W. HuTcmsoN & DAVID
YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTEcNG LAW AND PRACTICE 21-22 (1989) (discussing the
standards for choice of offense guideline).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Goldfaden, 959 F.2d 1324 (5th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a district court may consider only the count of conviction, not defendant's relevant conduct under Guideline section 1B1.2, in selecting the most
applicable guideline).
90. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.2(a); see Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at
501 (describing the origin of this exception).
91. See United States v. Braxton, 111 S.Ct. 1854 (1991) (narrowly interpreting Guideline § 1B1.2(a)'s proviso).
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More important, because the offense Guidelines are generic
in nature, addressing categories of criminal conduct rather than
specific statutes,9 2 in many instances the Guideline provisions
applicable to an offense are identical to the provisions applicable
to a more-serious-offense. For example, a defendant charged
93
with assaulting a federal officer with a dangerous weapon
might enter into a plea agreement with the government to drop
the allegation concerning the dangerous weapon. As this would
reduce the applicable maximum sentence, 9 4 the defendant
might expect to receive a corresponding reduction in the sentencing guideline range. Because the same guideline applies to
the two charges, 9 5 however, the court would still increase the
guideline9 6score if it finds that the defendant possessed or used a
weapon.
In addition, even if a lesser offense is covered by a separate
guideline, the offense level may be identical to that applicable to
the more-serious-offense, depending on the judge's view of the
defendant's "real" conduct. For example, a defendant might initially be charged with tax evasion and plead guilty to making a
false statement on his tax return, an offense with a lower statutory maximum penalty than tax evasion. 97 Nonetheless, if the
sentencing court concludes that the "the offense was committed
the guideline range will be
in order to facilitate evasion of a 9tax,"
8
identical to that for tax evasion.
Such applications of alleged more-serious-offense real-offense sentencing are the exception rather than the rule under
the Guidelines. 9 9 The appearance of this form of real-offense
92. There is one fraud guideline, not a separate guideline for each statute
prohibiting some form of fraud. See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 500.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (1988).
94. The maximum term of imprisonment for assaulting a federal officer
with a dangerous weapon is ten years. Id. The maximum term of imprisonment if no dangerous weapon is used is three years. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (1988).
95. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2A2.2.
96. Id. § 2A2.2(b)(2).
97. Tax evasion carries a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. 26
U.S.C. § 7201 (1988). The maximum term for making a false statement on a
tax return is three years. 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1988).
98. Tax evasion is covered by Guideline Section 2T1.1. U.S.S.G., supra
note 2, § 2T1.1. False statements are covered by Section 2T1.3. Id. § 2T1.3.
Under § 2T1.3(a)(1), however, the base offense level is taken from the tax table
in § 2T4.1, the same source for the base offense level for tax evasion, if "the
offense was committed in order to facilitate evasion of a tax." Id. § 2T1.3(a)(1).
99. There appears to be a recent trend towards greater use of alleged moreserious-offense sentencing in the Guidelines. The Commission has required
such sentencing for several additional offenses. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
amend. 320, 444, 448.
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sentencing is apparently haphazard, because the Sentencing
Commission has not explained its approach.100 Contrary to
what one might expect, the Guidelines offer no guidance as to
why defendants are sometimes, but not always, sentenced based
on alleged criminal conduct that is more serious than the offense
of conviction.

B.

OFFENDER INFORMATION

1.

Offender Characteristics

The Guidelines take a restrictive view of offender characteristics. They generally instruct judges to give only limited consideration to offender characteristics that have historically
played a role in sentencing, such as age, education, mental and
emotional conditions, drug or alcohol dependence, employment
record, community ties, and family ties and responsibilities.
The Sentencing Commission has not really explained this position, but it seems to have been motivated by fears of disparity
and discrimination resulting from consideration of such factors, 10 1 and by the Sentencing Commission's adoption of a
10 2
"harm-based penology."
2.

Criminal History

The defendant's criminal history does play a significant role
under the Guidelines. Chapter Four of the Guidelines attaches
a score to the defendant's history of criminal conviction, which
attempts to measure the "frequency, recency, and seriousness"
of the defendant's prior criminal conduct.' 0 3 This score becomes
the horizontal axis on the Guidelines' sentencing table. 10 4 The
defendant's alleged criminal history is not specifically incorporated into the Guidelines, but the Commission invites sentencing judges to impose a harsher sentence than that called for by
the Guidelines if "reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness
100. See infra, part IV.B. This is unfortunately true of much of the Sentencing Commission's work.
101. See Breyer, supra note 4, at 19-20.
102. The Guidelines generally require harm-based, rather than offenderbased sentencing, a limitation for which the Commission has been frequently
criticized. See, e.g., Freed, supra note 32, at 1715-18.

103. Breyer, supra note 4, at 20.
104. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5A (Sentencing Table).
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of the defendant's past criminal conduct or
the likelihood that
05
the defendant will commit other crimes."'
3.

Post-Offense Behavior

The Guidelines take post-offense behavior into account in
several important respects. First, application of the Guidelines
is based upon conduct occurring, inter alia,"in the course of at06
tempting to avoid detection or responsibility" for the offense.'
In addition, several adjustments from Chapter Three of the
Guidelines measure particular aspects of post-offense behavior.
The defendant receives a two level increase in the offense score
(on average a twenty-five to thirty percent increase in sentence
length) "if the defendant willfiffly obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant
offense. " 10 7 Although such conduct could occur prior to or during the offense, most forms of obstruction leading to this adjustment, such as perjury, 0 8 occur after the offense is completed.
Another two level increase applies if the defendant recklessly
endangered another person while fleeing from a law enforcement officer.' 0 9 The defendant may receive a two level reduction if the defendant "clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense."" 0°
4. Alleged Related-Offenses
Finally, the most controversial aspect of the Guidelines is
probably the Commission's treatment of alleged related-offense
sentencing. The primary governing principle is set forth in the
relevant conduct guideline," referred to by the chairman and
general counsel of the Sentencing Commission as the "corner105. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 4A1.3. This provision has been criticized as
an open invitation to sentencing disparity. See Sentencing Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 326-327 (1987) (statement of Andrew von Hirsch).

106. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a).
107. Id. § 3C1.1.
108. The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of increasing
a defendant's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for committing perjury while
testifying in his or her own defense. The Court rejected claims that this practice unduly chills the defendant's right to testify. United States v. Dunnigan,
113 S.Ct. 1111, 1113 (1993).
109. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 3C1.2.
110. Id. § 3E1.1.
111. Id. § 1B1.3.
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stone" of the guideline system. 112 According to section
1B1.3(a)(1), a judge applying the Guidelines must consider the
following:
all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or wilfully caused by the defendant...
that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in
preparation for that offense, or in the course
1 3 of attempting to avoid
detection or responsibility for that offense.

This provision appears to reject alleged related-offense real-offense sentencing by limiting the focus at sentencing to the offense of conviction. The section immediately following this
language indicates, however, that the drafters intended the
Guidelines to take into account much more related real-offense
conduct for most cases. For those offenses for which the applicable guideline primarily bases the offense level on an amount or
quantity involved in the offense, the court determines the offense level based on "all acts and omissions... that were part of
the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the
offense of conviction."" 4 Such offenses"35 include fraud, theft,
tax offenses, narcotics distribution, bribery, counterfeiting, firearms offenses, antitrust violations, and money laundering, and
constitute approximately seventy to eighty percent of the federal
criminal docket."16 For a defendant convicted of one of these offenses, the Guideline sentence is based on all similar alleged offenses in "the same course of conduct or common scheme or
plan," even if the defendant was not charged with the alleged
offenses,"3 7 such charges were dropped pursuant to a plea agree20
ment,"

8

or the defendant was acquitted"

9

of such charges.'

112. Willdns & Steer, supra note 5, at 496.

113. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a)(1).
114. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
115. The offenses that are included in § 1B1.3(a)(2) are those identified in
the multiple count grouping rule in § 3D1.2(d). See U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 1B1.3(a)(2).
116. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 53, tbl. 15
(1992).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495-96 (7th Cir. 1990).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Salva, 902 F.2d 483, 488-89 (7th Cir. 1990).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Fonner, 920 F.2d 1330, 1332 (7th Cir. 1990).
120.

The Ninth Circuit has been a cauldron of controversy, because it has

resisted critical aspects of the Sentencing Commission's real-offense approach.
Initially, a panel of the Ninth Circuit found § 1B1.3 in conflict with the multiple
count rules in Chapter Three and declined to aggregate drug quantities from
alleged related-offenses. United States v. Restreppo, 833 F.2d 781, 786 (9th
Cir. 1989). The panel later reversed itself. United States v. Restreppo, 903 F.2d

648 (9th Cir. 1990) affd en banc, 946 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1564 (1992). The court has continued, however, to impose significant re-
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A sentencing system that plans to take into account alleged
related-offenses must define the nature of the relationship between the conviction and alleged offenses that will cause the alleged offenses to be considered at sentencing. The defining and
limiting concept in the Guidelines' version of alleged related-offense real-offense sentencing is the phrase "same course of con12 1
duct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
Although the Guidelines do not define this phrase, the drafters
seem to have designed it to identify those alleged offenses that
are linked in some important way to the offense of conviction.
The chairman and general counsel of the Sentencing Commission have explored the meaning of this phrase in a much-cited
article. 12 2 In their view, the clause "common scheme or plan" is
closely analogous to the provision of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure pertaining to joinder of offenses, 123 which suggests a focus "on the connection between the offenses in terms of
time interval, common accomplices, common victims, similar
modus operandi, or other evidence of a common criminal endeavor involving separate criminal acts."1 2 4 The authors furstrictions on real-offense sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Castro-

Cervantes, 927 F.2d 1079, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that courts cannot
base upward departure in robbery case on additional alleged robberies that
were dismissed as part of plea agreement); United States v. Faulkner, 934 F.2d
190, 193 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that courts cannot base upward departure in
robbery case on uncharged robberies); United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844,
851 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that courts cannot base upward departure on acquitted conduct).
More recently, the Ninth Circuit has distinguished between offenses such
as robbery and offenses subject to alleged related-offense sentencing under
§§ 1B1.3 and 3D1.2. In United States v. Fine a panel applied the rule from
Castro-Cervantesto a mail fraud case, an offense where alleged related-offense

sentencing is required by § 1B1.3. After a rehearing en banc, however, the

court reversed itself and, aligning itself with all of the other courts of appeals,
held that for offenses covered by §§ 1B1.3(a)(2) and 3D1.2(d), courts can include
dismissed counts as relevant conduct. United States v. Fine, 946 F.2d 650, 652

(9th Cir. 1991), rev'd in part,remanded in part en banc, 975 F.2d 596, 600 (9th

Cir. 1992).
The Ninth Circuit's approach to these issues is criticized in Steven E. Zipperstein, Relevant Conduct and Plea Bargaining,4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 223
(1992).
121. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a)(2).
122.

See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 515-16. A number of courts have

relied on the authors' explanation in interpreting the relevant conduct provi-

sion. See, e.g., United States v. Bethley, 973 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 1323 (1993); United States v. Santiago, 906 F.2d 867, 872 (2d

Cir. 1990)).
123.
124.

FED. R. CrM. P. 8(a).
Wilkins & Steer, supra note 5, at 515 (citation omitted). As an exam-

ple, the authors suggest that "multiple embezzlements over a period of time, or
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ther suggest that the other clause, "same course of conduct,"
"contemplates that there be sufficient similarity and temporal
proximity to reasonably suggest that repeated instances of criminal behavior constitute a pattern of criminal conduct." 1 2 5 Some
a sort of sliding scale of these
courts have 1 2recommended
6
components.
The impact of the alleged related-offense approach is substantial. 12 7 For example, if the sentencing judge concludes that
a defendant convicted of one count of fraud involving $10,000
actually committed three frauds totalling $50,000 in the same
course of conduct, the defendant's guideline range would be calculated based on the higher amount. 1 28 The judge also applies
the specific offense characteristics and adjustments based on all
of the offenses included in the same course of conduct. 1 29 Thus,
if in one of the frauds not leading to conviction the defendant
defrauded more than one victim,' ° targeted a vulnerable victim, 13 1 or played a leadership role,'3 2 the defendant's offense
multiple drug deliveries on different occasions would each be considered part of
a 'common scheme or plan'." Id.
125. Id. at 515-16. The authors give the following example, which contrasts
the two clauses:
[I]f a drug dealer sells heroin to various customers on one day and cocaine to various customers on the next day, his conduct may or may not
be part of a "common scheme or plan." There can be little doubt, however, that his conduct is within the "same course of conduct" heading
because of the similarity and close temporal proximity of his illegal actions. Similarly, a crime spree of larcenies might not fit the definition
of "common scheme or plan," but would be considered part of the "same
course of conduct."
Id. at 516; see also, United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that the trial court properly included two kilograms of cocaine that
defendant sold in March 1988 in calculating the base offense level for conviction
of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in July 1988 as defendant's crimes were part
of "same course of conduct").
126. See, e.g., United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1992)
("When one component is absent,... courts must look for a stronger presence of
at least one of the other components.").
127. See Heaney, supra note 37, at 209-10 (finding that in districts studied,
one half of sentences were increased based on uncharged conduct).
128. The fraud guideline, § 2F1.1, provides for an adjustment in the offense
level based on the amount of the loss. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2F1.l(b)(1).
A $10,000 loss increases the offense level two levels, while a $50,000 loss increases the offense level five levels. See id.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Paulk, 917 F.2d 879, 883 (5th Cir. 1990) (enhancing the defendant's offense level for possession of firearm although defendant was not convicted of that offense).
130. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2F1.1(b)(2) (providing for a two level
increase).
131. Id. § 3A1.1 (providing for a two-level increase).
132. Id. § 3Bl.1 (providing for a two-, three-, or four-level increase).
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score will be increased despite the lack of a conviction on such
counts. In contrast, a defendant convicted of one count of robbery 133 would not have the amounts of other robberies committed in the same course of conduct aggregated, because section
3D1.2(d) does not apply to robbery.' 3 4 Similarly, a judge would
only apply the specific offense characteristics and adjustments
for robbery on the basis of convicted counts.
United States v. Colon'3 5 illustrates the potential impact of
alleged related-offense sentencing under the Guidelines. Colon
plead guilty to conspiring to distribute heroin, possessing heroin
with the intent to distribute, and to other substantive narcotics
offenses. 13 6 The trial judge originally calculated a sentencing
range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months, based on a finding
that the quantity of heroin the defendant plead guilty to selling
to undercover officers and possessing at the time of his arrest
was approximately seven and one-half grams. 13 7 The Second
Circuit ruled on the first appeal that under the Guidelines the
judge was required to include all quantities of narcotics Colon
sold as part of the same course of conduct as the offenses of conviction. 138 On remand, the judge based the offense level on the
400 grams of heroin that the judge estimated Colon sold over a
300 day period prior to the offense of conviction. 13 9 The court
then sentenced Colon, within the applicable guideline range, to
a term of fourteen years imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed this approximate tripling of the applicable sentencing
range based on the inclusion of Colon's alleged relatedoffenses. 140

133. See id. § 2B3.1.
134. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 3D1.2(d).
135. United States v. Colon, 961 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Colon

III.

136. Id. at 42.
137. Id.
138. United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d 580, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter
Colon 1], remanded for resentencing, sentence affd, 961 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1992).
Originally, the trial judge did not incorporate these amounts in the base offense
level, but did rely on them to justify a substantial upward departure from the
applicable guideline range. Id.
139. Colon II, 961 F.2d at 43.
140. Id.; see also United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 387-89 (2d Cir.
1992), petition for cert. filed sub. nom. United States v. Frias (U.S. June 23,
1993) (increasing the applicable guideline range from 12 to 36 months to 210 to
262 months based upon conduct of which the defendant had been acquitted).
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IV. ALLEGED RELATED-OFFENSE SENTENCING: DID
THE COMMISSION DRAW A WISE LINE?
The mere fact that the Sentencing Commission compromised between the extremes of real- and charge-offense sentencing does not ensure success. Sometimes it is better not to
compromise, but to choose one option nearly in its entirety. This
is apparently the view of the states that have adopted sentencing guidelines, all of whom have opted for sytems which are far
more charge-offense oriented than the Guidelines. 14 1
Even assuming a compromise is in order, the results can be
either elegant or irrational. If two competing alternatives have
attractive and undesirable features, a sound compromise should
capture as many of the benefits of each position as possible,
while limiting the negative consequences of each option. This
delicate task of harmonizing conflicting approaches requires
sound theory and judgment, not simply splitting the difference.
The Sentencing Commission's treatment of alleged relatedoffenses is the most controversial aspect of its approach to realoffense sentencing, and is troubling on a number of levels. The
line the Sentencing Commission drew-between a strong version of alleged related-offense sentencing for many offenses and
a much more charge-offense oriented approach for others-requires strikingly different treatment of the two categories of offenses. The Sentencing Commission does not justify these
apparent anomalies. It has offered only a limited, and ultimately unsatisfying, rationale for employing alleged related-offense sentencing at all, and for treating the two categories of
offenses in such a radically different manner. Given this background, it should not be surprising that the Sentencing Commission's approach to alleged related-offenses has not worked. Not
only is the unfairness inherent in real-offense sentencing clearly
present, but the very evils this system is designed to avoid re141. According to Michael Tonry, all of the states that have adopted sentencing guidelines have rejected real-offense sentencing in favor of a chargeoffense approach. Tonry, supra note 6, at 356-57. Professor Tonry's use of the
term real-offense sentencing is more narrow than the definition employed in
this article. His definition of real-offense sentencing roughly correlates to criminal offense characteristics, alleged more-serious-offenses, and alleged relatedoffenses. In this sense, the states have generally rejected real-offense sentencing. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 9.94A.370(2) (1988). There are exceptions to
this general rule, however. For a more complete discussion of state practices,
see Reitz, supra note 13, at 535-40.
In addition, states have generally taken a more permissive attitude towards noncriminal offense characteristics. See, e.g., infra note 258 and accompanying text.
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main largely undisturbed. In the end, this major component of
the Sentencing Commission's compromise on real-offense sentencing reveals itself to be irrational, pernicious and ineffective.
A.

THE IMPACT

OF THE

GUIDELINES' APPROACH

The Sentencing Commission's basic compromise on alleged
related-offense sentencing is that for one category of offenses,
the type for which the Guideline range is determined largely on
the basis of an amount or quantity, the sentence is based not
solely on the offense of conviction, but also on "all acts and omissions.., that were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction." 142 This rule requires radically different treatment for the two categories of offenses and generates puzzling results.
Imagine that Defendant A has robbed $10,000 from a bank
and Defendant B has sold three grams of cocaine base ("crack").
14 3
Both defendants would have an offense level of twenty-two.
Now instead assume that each defendant has committed two offenses. Defendant A robbed $10,000 from each of two banks,
and possessed a gun while committing the second offense. Defendant B sold three grams of crack on two occasions, and during the second offense possessed a gun. Each defendant, if
convicted on both counts, would have a guideline offense level of
twenty-eight.'" If, however, they are each convicted only of the
142. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a)(2); see supra part m.B.4.
143. Defendant A's offense level would be calculated starting from the base
offense level for robbery, which is 20. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2B3.1(a).
There is a two-level increase for taking the property of a financial institution.
Id. § 2B3.1(b)(1). There is no adjustment for taking $10,000 or less. Id.
§ 2B3.1(b)(6).
Defendant B's offense level would be calculated based on a "Drug Quantity
Table". Id. § 2D1.1(a)(3). The offense level applicable to three grams of crack is
22. Id. § 2D1.1(c)(11).
144. Defendant A's offense level would be determined starting with the offense level for the first robbery which is 22, as in the previous example. The
offense level for the second robbery is 27 (base offense level of twenty, plus two
levels for taking property of financial institution, plus five levels for possessing
a gun. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 2B3.1(b)(1) & 2B3.1(b)(2)(C), respectively.
Chapter 3,part D of the Guidelines establishes the rules for dealing with multiple counts of conviction. Id. § 3D. Offenses are arranged in one or more
"groups," an offense level is determined for each group, and the final offense
level is determined by taking the group with the highest offense level and increasing it depending upon the number and seriousness of the other groups.
See id. §§ 3D1.2, 3D1.3, & 3D1.4, respectively. Each of Defendant A's robberies
would be a separate group under § 3D1.2 (unless the defendant robbed the
same bank each time and the robberies were "connected by a common criminal
objective" or constituted "part of a common scheme or plan," in which case they
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first offense, their situations are entirely different. Defendant A
would have an offense level of twenty-two, a reduction of six
levels. This is a significant reduction. For a first offender, the
sentencing range for level twenty-eight is seventy-eight to
ninety-seven months of imprisonment. For level twenty-two,
14 5
however, the range is only forty-one to fifty-one months.
Defendant B, in contrast, would retain an offense level of
twenty-eight. What has happened, in effect, is that if Defendant
A is convicted of only one count of robbery (e.g., because of a
charge bargain or an acquittal), the other robbery "disappears"--it is not included in the Guidelines calculation. In contrast, even if Defendant B is only convicted of one count of
selling drugs, the guideline sentence will be determined based
on both sales. Thus, conduct not leading to a conviction can
have a dramatic effect on the sentence of a drug defendant, but
not a robbery defendant.
It is not merely the base offense level that is affected by
these grouping and aggregation rules. For section 3D1.2(d) offenses, specific offense characteristics present in counts that are
grouped despite the lack of a conviction are added to the defendant's offense level. In the above example, when the defendants
are only convicted on the first count, the drug defendant, but not
the robbery defendant, receives an increase in his or her base
offense level for possessing a gun during the second offense.
Similarly, assume a defendant in a fraud case engaged in more
than minimal planning and pretended to be acting on behalf of a
charitable organization. Even if the defendant was not convicted for this conduct, the defendant's offense level would be
in the same course of
increased by four levels since it occurred
146
conduct as the offense of conviction.
would be grouped together, and the defendanfs resulting offense level would be
27 - the level of the highest count in the group). The total number of "units"
under § 3D1.4 would be one and one-half (one for the count with the highest
level, plus one half for the other count because it is five to eight levels less
serious than the highest level). See id. § 3D1.4(b). A total of one and one-half
units adds one level to the highest group, so the final offense level from Chapter
Two would be 28.
Defendant B's offense level would be determined differently. The drug trafficking guideline, § 2D1.1, is included in § 3D1.2(d), which requires the court to
treat both counts as one group and aggregate all of the conduct and harm. Id.
§§ 2D1.1, 3D1.2(d). Thus, the offense level would be 28: the base offense level
of 26, is drawn from the Drug Quantity Table and based on a total of six grams
of cocaine base from the two offenses, plus two levels for the possession of a gun.
See id. §§ 2D1.1(c)(9) & 2D1.1(bX1), respectively.
145. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5A.
146. See id. § 2Fl.l(b)(2), (b)(3).
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Some of the adjustments from Chapter Three of the Guidelines can compound this effect. Adjustments such as vulnerable
victim 1 47 and leadership role in the offense 148 can, for offenses
grouped under section 3D1.2(d), be based on conduct in related
counts for which the defendant has not been convicted. The
same is not true for non-3D1.2(d) offenses, like robbery. This is
because most of the Chapter Three adjustments are tied into the
relevant conduct principle. The sentencing judge makes adjustments such as vulnerable victim and aggravating role in the offense based on all of the defendant's relevant
conduct, not just
49
that occurring in the offense of conviction.
Furthermore, for defendants convicted of non-3D1.2(d) offenses, even the presence of a Chapter Three adjustment factor
in a second count of conviction may not effect the guideline
range. If a defendant has been convicted of two robberies, with
offense levels (excluding adjustments from Chapter Three) of
thirty and twenty-six respectively, an increase in the second
count's level to twenty-eight for selecting a vulnerable victim
will have no effect on the applicable guideline range, despite the
conviction on that count.' 5 0 For a 3D1.2(d) offense, in contrast,
the presence of a vulnerable victim in a related count will cause
a two level increase, whether or not the defendant is convicted of
that second count.
The impact of a second charge of equal or lesser seriousness,
in terms of the offense level associated with that second charge,
also differs greatly depending upon the nature of the offenses.
For the robbery defendant, conviction on a second robbery count
of equal seriousness will increase the offense level by two.' l l
For the offender sentenced under a 3D1.2(d)-grouped offense,
the impact is much less predictable. If it closely resembles the
first count, the second count may have no effect on the guideline
range, adding little to the base offense level, specific offense
15 2
characteristics, or adjustments applicable to the first count.
147. Id. § 3A1.1.
148. Id. § 3B1.1.
149. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1Bl.3(a).
150. A conviction on a second robbery count with an offense level of either 26
or 28 would add two levels to the offense level of the first count. See id. § 3D1.4.
151. See id. § 3D1.4.
152. For example, assume that a defendant has committed two frauds in the
same course of conduct. The first netted $40,000, involved more than minimal
planning, a vulnerable victim, and an abuse of a position of trust. The second
fraud netted $30,000, but was otherwise identical to the first. The offense level
applicable to each fraud considered separately would be sixteen: base offense
level of six, plus four levels for the amount of the fraud, plus two levels each for

19931

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

437

A second count with the same offense level but with a different
mix of specific offense characteristics and adjustments, however,
could increase the offense level by many levels 15 3 Thus, the second robbery adds two levels, but only if the defendant is convicted of both crimes; the second fraud may add nothing even if
it results in a conviction, or it may add months or years to the
presumptive sentence even if there has not been a conviction on
that second count.
The consequences of this situation for plea bargaining are
dramatic, particularly if the defendant has committed multiple
offenses with very different offense levels. For non-3D1.2(d)
counts the prosecutor can offer the defendant potentially very
large sentence decreases if the defendant is allowed to plead to
the lesser charge, thus eliminating guideline consideration of
the more-serious-offense. The prosecutor can offer Defendant A,
who robbed two banks, a reduction of six levels (not including
two additional levels for accepting responsibility) by dropping
the second count. For a defendant with no prior record, this
reduces the likely sentence approximately three and one-half
years.' 54 In contrast, dropping the second of Defendant B's
crack sales has no effect on the guideline range. Thus, as one
would expect, as the Guidelines are designed to be applied, the
more than minimal planning, vulnerable victim, and abuse of a position of

trust. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, §§ 2Fl.(a), 2Fl.(b)(1), 2FL.(b)(2), 3A1.1 &
3B1.3 respectively. Grouping them together would have no effect on the guideline range because the total amount, $70,000, does not provide any increase
over the lower individual amounts, and the specific offense characteristics and
adjustments are identical.
153. In this example, again assume that a defendant has committed two
frauds in the same course of conduct. The first netted $40,000, involved more
than minimal planning, a vulnerable victim, and an abuse of a position of trust.
The second fraud netted $175,000, and the defendant played a managerial role
in the offense. As in the prior example, the offense level applicable to the first
fraud would be sixteen. See supra note 152. The offense level applicable to the
second fraud would also be sixteen (base offense level of six, plus seven levels
for the amount of the fraud, plus three levels for the managerial role). See
U.S.S.G., supra note 2, §§ 2Fl.(a), 2F1.1(b)(1), & 3B1.1(b) respectively. Unlike
the previous example, however, grouping these two offenses together would produce an increase in the offense level to twenty-three (base offense level of six,
plus eight levels for the amount of the fraud, plus three levels for the managerial role, plus two levels each for more than minimal planning, vulnerable victim, and abuse of a position of trust). Id. §§ 2F1.1(a), 2Fl.(b)(1), 3B1.l(b),

2FL.(b)(2), 3AL.1 & 3B1.3 respectively. This seven level increase would more
than double the offender's likely prison sentence, from a range of 21 to 27
months to a range of 46 to 57 months. Id. § 5A (Sentencing Table).
154. This reduction assumes the judge selected the midpoint from the appli-

cable guideline range.
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utility of charge bargaining is dramatically different depending
on whether alleged related-offense sentencing applies.' 55
B.

THE RATIONALE FOR ALLEGED RELATED-OFFENSE
SENTENCING

As illustrated above, the Guidelines divide federal criminal
offenses into two categories, those that fall under Section
3D1.2(d) and those that do not, and treat alleged related-offenses in each category dramatically differently. This stark contrast in treatment raises two questions: why did the Sentencing
Commission include mandatory alleged related-offense sentencing at all, and why did it distinguish between the two categories
of cases?
In view of the serious questions of fairness raised by employing alleged related-offense sentencing and the marked discrepancy in the manner in which the two categories of offenses
are treated, and the fact that this practice deviates sharply from
56
past practice and all previous efforts at sentencing reform,
one would reasonably expect the Sentencing Commission to offer
a thoroughgoing justification for its position. Unfortunately, the
Sentencing Commission's rationale for the alleged related-offense component of the Guidelines is sketchy at best.15 7 The
only real discussion takes place in the commentary to section
lB1.3, the relevant conduct guideline.' 58 Here the Sentencing
Commission explains why alleged related-offense real-offense
sentencing applies to offenses when the guideline range is determined largely by an amount or quantity as follows:
Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) adopt different rules because offenses of
the character dealt with in subsection (a)(2) (i.e., to which § 3D1.2(d)
applies) often involve a pattern of misconduct that cannot readily be
broken into discrete, identifiable units that are meaningful for purposes of sentencing....

In addition, the distinctions that the law

makes as to what constitutes separate counts or offenses often turn on
technical elements that are not especially meaningful for purposes of
sentencing ....

Another consideration is that in a pattern of small

thefts, for example, it is important to take into account the full range of
155. But see infra notes 178-209 and accompanying text (discussing the
ways in which plea bargaining retains vitality despite alleged related-offense
sentencing).
156.

See supra note 141.

157. This is consistent with the Sentencing Commission's general failure to
articulate its principles. See supra note 75 and infra part lV.B.
158. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3. The section of Chapter One, part
A(4)(a) labeled "Real Offense vs. Charge Offense Sentencing" does not address
the substance of alleged related-offense sentencing, and is generally limited to a
justification of the Commission's approach to offense characteristics.
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related conduct. Relying on the entire range of conduct, regardless of
the number of counts that are alleged or on which a conviction is obtained, appears to be the most reasonable approach to writing workable guidelines for these offenses. Conversely, when § 3D1.2(d) does not
apply, so that convictions on multiple counts are considered separately
in determining the guideline sentencing range, the guidelines prohibit
aggregation of quantities from other counts in order to prevent "double
counting" of the conduct and harm from each count of conviction. Continuing offenses present similar practical problems. The reference to
§ 3D1.2(d), which provides for grouping of multiple counts arising out
of a continuing offense when the offense guideline takes the continuing
1 59
nature into account, also prevents double counting.

This explanation is rather opaque. For example, the Commission states that the offenses subject to alleged related-offense sentencing often "involve a pattern of misconduct that
cannot readily be broken into discrete, identifiable units that are
meaningful for purposes of sentencing." The Commission seems
to be saying that just punishment requires the court to take into
account the defendant's entire range of related conduct for such
offenses. One must ask, however, why the counts of conviction
do not fairly reflect the conduct for which the defendant should
be punished. If the "pattern of misconduct" can be identified at
sentencing, the elements of that pattern should be chargeable.
If such elements are not charged, it must be that the prosecutor
chose not to bring all of the possible charges, some charges were
bargained away, or a jury rejected some charges and acquitted
the defendant.
The Sentencing Commission's rationale for alleged relatedoffense sentencing, then, seems to focus primarily on the fear of
"count manipulation" in a charge-offense system and seeks to
correct "erroneous" charging and bargaining decisions. 160 This
is in effect a restatement of the conventional wisdom that a
charge-offense system shifts sentencing authority to the prosecutor. 1 6 1 Although the Commission does not elaborate on this
concept, it would seem that count manipulation could manifest
itself in one of two ways: undercharging or overcharging. A
prosecutor might seek to ensure an unduly lenient sentence for
an offender by bringing charges that, in terms of the number of
counts or their severity, understate the seriousness of the offender's misconduct. Conversely, if the number of counts affect
159. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3 (Background).
160. The Commission's concern with correcting "erroneous" acquittals
seems secondary, as acquittals are not discussed in any of the Guidelines sections or commentary applicable to alleged related-offense sentencing.
161. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
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the severity of the resulting sentence, a prosecutor could punish
an offender by taking what was really one criminal episode and
breaking it up into a number of counts.
Neither of these possible explanations for the Sentencing
Commission's decision to adopt a version of alleged related-offense sentencing withstands closer scrutiny. Although the ability of the prosecutor to secure overly lenient sentences for
favored offenders would certainly contribute to unwarranted
disparity, this is a particularly weak justification for the Sentencing Commission's decision to punish defendants based on
crimes for which they have not been convicted. First, its goal is
probably unattainable. There are many sources of prosecutorial
leniency outside of the control of the Sentencing Commission.
The prosecutor can decline to file charges, or can fie charges
with a low statutory maximum penalty. 1 62 Through "fact bargaining" 163 and other devices, the prosecutor can keep from the
court the information necessary to the operation of real-offense
sentencing. In addition, the Guidelines themselves offer prosecutors avenues to circumvent real-offense sentencing. These avenues include charging counts not subject to grouping under
section 3D1.2(d), which are therefore not eligible for alleged related-offense treatment, T6 and filing substantial assistance motions under section 5K1.1, which authorizes the court to depart
below the applicable guideline range, even if such motions are
16 5
not completely warranted.
Even if adopting real-offense sentencing would inhibit permissive plea bargains, such a policy would be unwise. There is
little reason to believe that undue prosecutorial leniency seriously obstructs the imposition of just punishment or frequently
162. Individual federal prosecutors have great latitude in selecting the
charges to be pursued. See Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of
Three Cities: An EmpiricalStudy of Chargingand BargainingPractices Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 506-12 (1992); see

also, Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 206-07 (describing the ability of prosecutors
to select charges to avoid mandatory sentences).
163. See, e.g., Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 547 ("Fact bargaining
occurs most often with respect to the amount of drugs or the particular drug
involved, such as substituting cocaine for crack, or in the dollar amount involved in economic crimes.").
164. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
165. Schulhofer and Nagel have uncovered evidence that some prosecutors
seem on occasion to make unwarranted substantial assistance motions. See
Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 522-23, 531-32, 550-51. Probation officers in one district the authors studied estimate that there is guideline evasion in 50% of the cases when the defendant provides some cooperation. Id. at
541.
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deprecates the seriousness of an offense. It is probably fair to
assume that prosecutors on the whole are not disposed toward
undue leniency. When prosecutors offer favorable treatment to
a defendant, it is usually either a pragmatic response to
caseload pressure, the vagaries of trial, the need to obtain the
defendant's cooperation in other prosecutions, or, as has been
evident under the Guidelines, a reaction to clearly excessive
sentences. Policy makers should not lightly eliminate a safety
valve mechanism of this sort. If they think that such practices
are problematic, they should address such problems by developing explicit controls or guidelines regulating the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion, 16 6 rather than by embracing alleged related-offense sentencing. The radical response of alleged related-offense sentencing is not commensurate with the problems
it seeks to remedy.
The other credible rationale for the Sentencing Commission's adoption of alleged related-offense sentencing, that prosecutors in a charge-oriented system may be able to inflate a
defendant's sentences by breaking up one criminal episode into
a number of counts, presents a more plausible and appropriate
concern. Prosecutors could bring a typical mail fraud case, for
example, as one count, alleging the entire scheme, or as many
counts, since each mailing is a separate offense. 16 7 It would indeed be disquieting if a prosecutor could increase the defendant's exposure by filing many counts, rather than one count
alleging the same misconduct. 168 The prosecutor's power would
be greatly enhanced, with all of the concerns that scenario
raises. Unwarranted disparity would increase, because, depending upon the prosecutor's decisions, defendants who committed
and were convicted of identical criminal behavior could receive
substantially different sentences.
These concerns, although legitimate, do not justify alleged
related-offense sentencing. In the first place, it is not clear to
what extent the Guidelines' version of alleged related-offense
166. Indeed, commentators have made many suggestions for the creation of
prosecutorial guidelines governing charging and bargaining. See, e.g., Norman
Abrams, InternalPolicy: Guiding the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19
UCLA L. Ray. 1, 8, 25-34 (1971); Stephen J. Schulhofer, SentencingIssues Facing the New Departmentof Justice, 5 FED. SENTENCING REP. 225 (1993); James
Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of CriminalJustice Officials, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 651, 678-83 (1976).
167. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916).
168. See United States v. Wheelwright, 918 F.2d 226, 229-30 (1st Cir. 1990)
(noting that the Guidelines' relevant conduct approach to "fungible items" is
designed to prevent double counting of amounts).
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sentencing in fact reduces the prosecutor's ability to influence
the severity of the defendant's sentence. The prosecutor can manipulate, and increase, the likely sentence for a particular defendant by, for example, charging offenses with high statutory
m axmum or mandatory minimum sentences, bringing additional charges not subject to grouping under § 3D1.2(d), or
bringing sequential charges against a defendant in separate
trials.169
More important, although a concern with punitive count
manipulation may warrant aggregation of counts of conviction,
it does not justify equating an alleged related-offense with a conviction offense. In other words, if the Sentencing Commission
wished to enforce the principle that two defendants convicted of
the same misconduct should not receive different sentences depending upon whether the prosecutor chooses to break up the
criminal episode into numerous counts, the most sensible approach would be to devise rules diminishing the importance of
the number of counts of conviction. One way to do this would be
the approach taken in the grouping rule of section 3D1.2(d). The
Guidelines could identify those types of offenses that "involve a
pattern of misconduct that cannot readily be broken into discrete, identifiable units that are meaningful for purposes of sentencing"1 70 and aggregate all of the counts of conviction for such
offenses.
Alleged related-offense sentencing is essentially irrelevant
to the question of punitive count manipulation. In the absence
of alleged related-offense sentencing, the prosecutor would have
an incentive to charge the defendant with all offenses the prosecutor thinks should influence the sentence. Whether the prosecutor has an incentive to break up a criminal episode into a
number of counts to obtain a harsher sentence, however, depends on how the guidelines deal with counts of conviction, not
on whether alleged related-offenses are considered. In fact, rejecting alleged related-offense sentencing probably gives the
169. The Guidelines may limit the prosecutor's ability to increase the total
sentence by proceeding via sequential trials for the same defendant. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5G1.3. The operation of this Guideline section is, however, by no means clear. See, United States v. Lechuga, 975 F.2d 397, 401 (7th
Cir. 1992) (holding that when a defendant is convicted in separate trials of two
offenses that would be grouped if tried together, the court should impose a sentence in the second case so that the total sentence is what the defendant would
have received if there had been only one trial, even if the court must depart
downward in the second case to reach that result).
170. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 111.3 (Background).
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prosecutor an incentive to bring less, rather than more counts if
there is a choice. Only in that way can the prosecutor ensure
that the sentence will be based on an alleged fraudulent scheme
as a whole, for example. If the prosecutor breaks the case up
into a number of charges, and the defendant is acquitted on any
of those counts, the allegations in those counts would not be considered at sentencing.
The prosecutor cannot gain any strategic advantage, in
terms of manipulating the sentence, by charging less than all of
the conduct for which the defendant might be convicted. 17 1 It is

therefore perverse to suggest that a defendant is protected from
count manipulation by allowing charges that the prosecutor did
not bring or dropped, or for which the172defendant was acquitted,
to increase the defendant's sentence.
Ironically, aside from section 3D1.2(d) grouping, the Guidelines already have rules that diminish the effect of punitive
count manipulation. The multiple count provisions of Chapter
Three, part D reflect a reasoned approach to the difficult question of multiple count convictions. 173 Under this approach,
counts of conviction in separate "groups" can increase the defendant's sentence, but only incrementally, with a maximum increase of only five levels, regardless of the amount and severity
of additional counts beyond the one yielding the highest offense
level. Thus, even if one repealed the alleged related-offense
component of the Guidelines, prosecutors in a drug case could
affect only a slight increase in the offense level by breaking a
criminal episode into a number of counts, an increase that might
171. The potential use of counts for which the defendant has been acquitted
demonstrates the grotesque nature of such a rationale. Assume the prosecutor
chooses to bring many counts against the defendant, rather than charging the
entire scheme as one count, and the defendant is then acquitted on one or more
of the counts. In this situation the Guidelines would still require the judge to
consider the acquitted counts if they were in the same course of conduct. It is
absurd to suggest that it is necessary to do this to protect the defendant from
the consequences of the prosecutor bringing multiple charges.
172. Some commentators have argued that real-offense sentencing of this
type gives the prosecutor an incentive not to bring some charges, such as those
that potentially are difficult to prove, since she knows that these allegations
will still be considered at sentencing. Freed, supra note 32, at 1714. It is probably more accurate to say that alleged related-offense sentencing reduces the
prosecutor's incentive to bring such charges. The prosecutor has nothing to lose
by bringing such charges, because even if the defendant is acquitted the prosecutor may still allege the facts at sentencing. Furthermore, the prosecutor still
has reasons to bring such charges, including maintaining leverage in plea negotiations and increasing the statutory maximum penalties the defendant faces.
173. For a useful discussion of the drafting principle the Sentencing Commission employed in this area, see Breyer, supra note 4, at 25-28.
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be offset by the decreased amount of drugs involved in each
count of conviction.
The Sentencing Commission has also failed adequately to
explain the location and manner in which it fixed the alleged
related-offense sentencing "line" between the two categories of
offenses. The differential treatment of the two categories alone
does not demonstrate that the dividing line is an irrational one.
Any time a policy line is drawn, with cases on either side of the
line dealt with differently, it will appear anomalous that cases,
similar to one another in some way, but on opposite sides of the
dividing line, receive dissimilar treatment. Whether this differential treatment is in fact anomalous depends upon the rationale for these rules. To use the language of sentencing reform,
whether these disparities in the Guidelines' approach to alleged
related-offenses are unwarranted depends upon the basis for the
location of that line and the manner in which it was drawn.
Because fear of count manipulation appears to have been
the prime motivating force behind the adoption of alleged related-offense sentencing, perhaps the Sentencing Commission
felt that certain types of offenses were more susceptible to count
manipulation, namely those that "often involve a pattern of misconduct that cannot readily be broken into discrete, identifiable
units that are meaningful for purposes of sentencing."174 In
other words, a prosecutor might be more likely to overlook an
additional small drug sale than an additional bank robbery.
This contention is questionable, because prosecutors have traditionally engaged in charge bargaining with all types of offenses.
More important, even if there is some truth to the idea that
some types of offenses are more susceptible to count manipulation, the Commission's response misses the mark. Even if a defendant is more likely to be convicted of a second robbery in the
same course of conduct than a second drug sale, once that second
robbery fails to lead to a conviction a judge should be just as
interested in the alleged robbery as the alleged drug sale. As
discussed above, possible distinctions between groups of offenses
may warrant different treatment of multiple counts of convicrelated-offense sentencing for
tion, but do not support alleged
1 75
others.
not
but
offenses
some
The Sentencing Commission's method of aggregating alleged related-offenses also is rather crude. For example, the
Guidelines treat alike three $10,000 thefts and one $30,000
174.
175.

U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3 (Background).
See supra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
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theft. This puts too much importance on the amount taken, a
fact that may be a matter of chance and beyond the control of
the offender. Most judges are likely to view the repeat offender
as more culpable and dangerous than the one-time offender who
happened to steal the same amount. The wisdom of the Commission's approach is further undercut by the unpredictable effect of the alleged related-offense rules as compared to the
multiple count rules applicable to non-3D1.2(d) offenses: someseverity of
times an alleged related-offense greatly increases the
76
effect.'
no
or
little
has
it
sometimes
the sentence,
The Sentencing Commission took a technique for separating
offenses and elevated it to a principle. The Commission decided
that for certain types of crimes, amounts would largely determine the sentence. Then, because they could easily count
amounts for nonconviction offenses, they did.' 7 7 This mechanical approach, apparently unguided by principle, seems destined
to accomplish very little of value.
C.

WHAT HAS ALLEGED RELATED-OFFENSE SENTENCING

ACCOMPLISHED?
The goals of real-offense sentencing are to increase proportionality, limit the impact of plea bargaining on sentencing, and
avoid excessive shifts of sentencing authority to the prosecutor.
For real-offense sentencing to be worth its costs-increased unfairness, or at least the appearance of unfairness, and a greater
administrative burden for the courts-there must be substantial
progress towards these goals. In almost all important respects,
the Sentencing Commission's adoption of alleged related-offense
sentencing has failed to further these goals.
Plea bargaining has retained much greater than anticipated
vitality under alleged related-offense sentencing. 178 As initially
promulgated, the Guidelines offered some significant loopholes
that enabled the parties to bargain their way out of alleged related-offense sentencing. In the narcotics area, for example, the
176. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
177. Professor Albert Alschuler has criticized the entire Guidelines' undertaking on this basis. See Alschuler, supra note 33, at 914-15 (stating that part
of the reason the Guidelines tend to be harm-based is that harms can be more
readily counted or quantified than can situational factors or offender
characteristics).
178. Commissioner flene Nagel and Professor Stephen Schulhofer have conducted the most complete studies to date about plea bargaining under the
Guidelines. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62; Nagel & Schulhofer, supra
note 162.
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Guidelines called for aggregating alleged related drug distribution offenses, but not "telephone counts" and simple possession.
Through charging and bargaining decisions, then, the prosecutor could determine whether alleged related-offense sentencing
applied to a narcotics defendant. A plea to a telephone count or
simple possession charge eliminated the Guidelines' consideration of other alleged drug activity in the same course of
conduct.179
The Sentencing Commission apparently recognized this situation and responded by trying to close the loopholes. In a series of amendments, the Sentencing Commission lengthened the
list of offenses subject to grouping under section 3D1.2(d) and,
accordingly, included in alleged related-offense sentencing, by
adding narcotics "telephone counts," 180 bribery,' 8 ' and some
firearms offenses.' 8 2 The Commission also considered adding
robbery to this list, but ultimately declined to do so.' 8 3 As a result, the Guidelines have become more and more alleged relatedcarefully considering
offense oriented without the Commission
84
the consequences of that shift.'
Despite these changes, there remain ways to plea bargain
out of alleged related-offense sentencing under the Guidelines,
or at least to limit its impact. The prosecutor may be able to
bring charges with a statutory maximum penalty below the sentence called for by the Guidelines. "Fact bargaining" can limit
the reach of relevant conduct.' 8 5 If, for example, the parties
agree that the offense involved a lesser amount of drugs than
might be provable at trial, they can manipulate, and lower, the
applicable guideline range. There is anecdotal evidence that
179. Prosecutors and defense lawyers have apparently used these same
mechanisms to evade the statutory mandatory minimum penalties applicable
to drug distribution and conpiracies. Stephen Schulhofer has wryly noted that
these provision seem to "have produced an epidemic of telephone use and simple possession," as '[i]n some federal districts, these counts have become the
most serious charge in up to thirty percent of all drug convictions." Schulhofer,
supra note 20, at 206-07; see also id. at 219.
180. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, amend. 320.
181. See id. app. C, amend. 121.
182. See id. app. C, amend. 349.
183. The Sentencing Commission published a proposed amendment adding
robbery to § 3D1.2(d) in January 1991, but ultimately declined to adopt this
amendment. See 56 Fed. Reg. 1846 (Jan. 17, 1991) (proposed amendment 7(c));
56 Fed. Reg. 2276 (May 16, 1991) (failing to included this amendment in final
amendments).
184. The Guidelines have increased the use of other forms of real-offense
sentencing over time as well. See supra note 99.
185. See supra note 163.
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this type of fact bargaining does, in fact, take place. 8 6 Parties
have also used "date bargaining," which occurs when the defendant agrees to plead guilty to a pre-guidelines offense for
criminal conduct straddling the Guidelines' November 1, 1987,
effective date.' 8 7 The Guidelines are then inapplicable.' 8 8 Furthermore, the prosecutor can, in his or her sole discretion, decide
to move for a downward departure from the Guidelines based on
the defendant's "substantial assistance." 8 9 This again gives the
prosecutor the ability to vitiate real-offense sentencing and
orchestrate a lower sentence for the defendant.' 9 0
Another way charge bargaining retains vitality relates to
the adjustments in Chapter Three of the Guidelines. Apparently the Commission intended these adjustments to be made on
the basis of the relevant conduct principle.' 9 1 A defendant
might, for example, engage in several drug transactions in the
same course of conduct, but have an aggravating role in the offense in only one such transaction. If the defendant pleads
guilty to one of the other counts, the aggravating role adjustment would seem to still apply. Several courts, however, have
limited the role in the offense adjustments to the offense of conviction. 19 2 Under such rulings, if the defendant pleads guilty to
a count in which the defendant did not play an aggravating role,
the defendant would not receive the aggravating role adjustment, despite having played such a role in the related dismissed
3
counts. 19
186. See, e.g., Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62, at 272-78 (discussing fact
bargaining).
187. Id. at 271-72 (discussing date bargaining).
188. See id. While date bargaining is undoubtedly occurring, it should
cease to be a significant factor as time goes on and there are fewer and fewer
straddle cases.
189. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5K1.1.
190. See supra note 162.
191. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 1B1.3(a).
192. See, e.g. United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1990)
superceded by statute as stated in United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292
(D.C. Cir. 1991)); United States v. Tetzlaff, 896 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1990)
superceded by statute as stated in United States v. Arrellano-Soto, Nos. 9150488, 91-50489, 91-50516, 91-50519, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14208 (9th Cir.
June 10, 1992); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
superceded by statute as stated in United States v. Saucedo, 977 F.2d 597 (10th
Cir. 1991).
193. The Sentencing Commission amended the Introductory Commentary to
the Role in the Offense Section of Chapter 3, effective November 1, 1990, in an
apparent attempt to clarify that these adjustments are to be based on the defendant's relevant conduct. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C, amend. 345.
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The parties do face certain obstacles in circumventing the
Guidelines' alleged related-offense provisions. The policies of
the Department of Justice in theory forbid a prosecutor from engaging in some of the practices described above. 19 4 One Department directive is that prosecutors not bargain away "readily
provable" charges. 195 The probation officer may stand in the
way of a charge bargain that deviates from the intent of the
guidelines. The judge may, based on a policy statement in the
Guidelines Manual, reject a charge bargain unless "the remaining charges adequately reflect the seriousness of the actual ofwill not undermine the
fense behavior and... the agreement
96
sentencing."
of
purposes
statutory
In practice, however, the parties retain a great deal of flexibility in plea bargaining. The Department of Justice only
loosely supervises line prosecutors, 1 97 giving them significant
leeway.' 9 8 Pre-indictment bargaining is particularly hard to
control.' 9 9 The probation officer may not have complete access
to the relevant facts, or the judge may ignore the probation officer's recommendation.2 0 0 In addition, judges remain very unlikely to reject plea agreements, out of deference to the
prosecutor's role, hostility to the Guidelines, concern with excessive sentences, or caseload pressures.
Paradoxically, then, the alleged related-offense component
of the Guidelines to some extent resembles the rejected charge194. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR!S HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT
OF 1984 (1987) (hereinafter REDBOOK); Memorandum from Richard Thorn-

burgh, Attorney General, Plea Bargaining Under the Sentencing Reform Act

(March 13, 1989), reprintedin HUTCHISON & YELLEN, supranote 88, at app. 12.
For a discussion of these provisions, see Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62, at
252-56; Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 506-12.

195.

REDBOOK,

supra note 194, at 46-47.

196. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 6B1.2(a).
197. See Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 544.
198. For example, prosecutors seem to apply a flexible concept of "readily
provable" charges, which enables them to dismiss counts in an effort to reach a
desired result in plea bargaining. Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at 549;
see also Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62, at 254-56.

199. See

COMMISSION, OPERATION REPORT,

supra note 68, executive sum-

mary 77-78 (finding that pre-indictment bargaining is likely to cause a study to
underestimate impact of plea bargaining on sentencing); see also David N. Yellen, Two Cheers For "A Tale of Three Cities", 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 567, 569-70
(1992) (discussing the practice of pre-indictment bargaining and arguing that it
has increased under the Guidelines).
200. See Heaney, supra note 42, at 169 n.22 (finding that judges calculate
the guideline range differently from the manner recommended by the probation
officer in ten percent of cases); Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 62, at 274-78.
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offense approach. 2 0 ' Real-offense sentencing remains partly
discretionary, as it was under the pre-Guidelines system; the
difference is that now the prosecutor, rather than the judge, exercises most of that discretion. Alleged related-offense sentenc20 2
ing, like mandatory minimum sentencing provisions,
strengthens the prosecutor's hand in plea bargaining: the prosecutor can dangle the "carrot" of charge-oriented sentencing
backed up by the "stick" of real-offense sentencing.20 3 If the defendant pleads guilty and the prosecutor collaborates, the defendant can avoid this aspect of real-offense sentencing and
receive a substantially lower sentence than would apply after
instead goes to trial, the real-offense protrial. If the defendant
20 4
visions loom large.
The carrot and stick of plea bargaining are particularly
forceful because of the widely shared perception that the Guidelines require severe sentences. 20 5 To a risk averse defendant,
201. This observation is consistent with Michael Tonry's insight that the
Guidelines as a whole resemble mandatory minimum sentencing provisions far
more than the Sentencing Commission would like to acknowledge. See Tonry,
supra note 11, at 131-32.
202. The Sentencing Commission itself has issued a report highly critical of
the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CoNGREss: MANDATORY MINI-

mum PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991) [hereinafter
MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT]. In particular, the Report observed that
mandatory minimum penalty provisions shift sentencing discretion to the prosecutor, inviting disparity, and undercut the Guidelines' goal of increasing proportionality. Id. at 27-34. Mandatory minimum penalty provisions invite
manipulation and evasion, according to the Sentencing Commission's data,
which indicates that offenders whose conduct warrants application of
mandatory sentences receive less than such mandatory sentences in approximately 41 percent of cases. Id at 89. In addition, mandatory minimum penalty
provisions appear to be applied in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 80
(finding that white defendants were sentenced below mandatory minimum penalties 46% of the time, black defendants only 32.3% of the time).
203. Professor Alschuler has analogized this situation to the well known
"good-cop, bad-cop" routine, with the Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines as the "bad-cop," and the prosecutor offering potential relief to the defendant as the "good-cop." Alschuler, supra note 33, at 928.
204. Not only has the Guidelines' alleged related-offense provision failed significantly to limit the prosecutor's authority in plea bargaining, but the available evidence also suggests that charge-offense systems have not experienced
the dramatic shifts of power to the prosecutor that some had predicted. See,
e.g., Reitz, supra note 13, at 541. There may be multiple factors at work here,
including the state guidelines' generally more reasonable severity level. This
evidence lends further support, however, to the inappropriateness of alleged
related-offense sentencing.
205. See, e.g., Heaney, supra note 42, at 176-79 (setting forth data suggesting a substantial increase in time served under the Guidelines). But see,
COMMISSION, 01ERATION REPORT, supra note 68, at executive summary 12 (in-
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this perceived severity may increase the value of the inducement
the prosecutor can offer for a guilty plea, or alternatively, the
penalty for going to trial. A guilty plea to a lesser charge may be
the defendant's only way to avoid a predictably long prison
term. 20 6 This is particularly true in drug cases, where charge
bargaining may allow a defendant to evade a stern mandatory
minimum sentence.
The rates at which narcotics defendants go to trial supports
this hypothesis. The percentage of narcotics trafficking convictions obtained after trial rather than by guilty plea is higher
than the trial conviction percentage for all offenses. 20 7 Conversely, virtually all of the convictions for simple possession and
use of communication facilities in connection with narcotics offenses result from guilty pleas. 20 8 Apparently, then, the government uses the "carrot" of lower Guideline ranges and statutory
maximum penalties, and the avoidance of mandatory minimums, as an incentive to plead guilty to lesser charges. Those
who do not accept or are not offered such bargains frequently opt
to "roll the dice" at trial.
There is no single pattern of plea bargaining under the
Guidelines. In fact, the available evidence suggests that plea
bargaining practices vary widely from district to district, from
judge to judge, and from prosecutor to prosecutor. 20 9 Similarly
terpreting the Sentencing Commission's interview data to indicate that a majority of judges, federal prosecutors and probation officers consider Guideline
sentences to be "mostly appropriate"). It is clear that drug sentences at least
"are higher than those that were common prior to the Guidelines, and not just
by a little bit... [but] orders of magnitude higher." Schuhofer, supra note 32,
at 853.
206. In interviews conducted by the Sentencing Commission, approximately
25% of responding prosecutors indicated that they might negotiate a plea reflecting less than the defendant's total offense behavior if the guideline sentence would otherwise be inappropriate. See COMIussION, OPERATION REPORT,
supra note 68, at 185, tbl. 54.
207. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1992 ANmuAL REPORT 59, tbl. 19 (1993).
In addition, a percentage of those pleading guilty to narcotics trafficking receive substantial assistance motions, thus effectively avoiding the Guidelines
and mandatory minimum penalties. See id. at 127, tbl. 50 (noting that over
70% of all downword departures are for substantial assistance). The percentage of narcotics trafficking defendants facing mandatory minimum terms or severe Guideline ranges who opt to go to trial may therefore be significantly
higher than 44%.
208. Id. The percentages are 94.4 and 98.3, respectively.
209. See Heaney, supra note 42, at 192 (discussing differences among jurisdictions in manipulative plea bargaining); Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162,
at 552-557 (same). For example, Nagel and Schulhofer estimate that in one
district plea bargaining is used to circumvent the guidelines in over 25% of the
cases, and to a "huge" extent in many of such cases. Id. at 534. In another
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situated offenders may receive very different guideline ranges
depending on such factors as the policies of the local U.S. Attorney's office, the skill of defense counsel, and the attitudes of the
prosecutor, judge, and probation officer. This diversity of attitudes and approaches introduces disparity and undermines the
goals of alleged related-offense sentencing.
The complexity of the relevant conduct standard also contributes to unwarranted disparity. Complexity invites errors in
application or inconsistent interpretation of key concepts. According to one commentator, "District judges, prosecutors, defenders, and probation officers are today demonstrating widely
different attitudes and practices respecting relevant conduct
within and across districts."2 10 A recent study by the Federal
Judicial Center confirms this hypothesis. 2 1 ' Many private defense counsel, in particular, have only a limited grasp of the intricacies lurking in the Guidelines. 2 12
Proportionality, too, has been an elusive goal.2 13 In fact, the
aggregation required by the Guidelines' alleged related-offense
principle, combined with the Guidelines' excessive reliance on
harm- and quantity-based specific offense characteristics, 2 14 has
district they found manipulation in only 7-11% of guilty plea cases. Id. at 526.
The forms, as well as the extent, of manipulation appear to vary as well.
210. Freed, supra note 32, at 1715.
211. The study prepared for the Federal Judicial Center found that probation officers apply different interpretations to the relevant conduct rules, resulting in different versions of real offense sentencing and dramatically different
sentencing ranges. See Pamela B. Lawrence & Paul J. Hofer, An Empirical
Study of the Application of Relevant Conduct Guideline § 1B1.3, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 330 (1992).
212. See, e.g., COMMIssIoN, OPERATION REPORT, supra note 68, at 90-93 (private attorneys' knowledge of Guidelines rated as fair or poor by most judges,
prosecutors, and probation officers); Nagel & Schulhofer, supra note 162, at
530 (indicating that probation officers rated the competence of private defense
counsel in Guideline matters as "abysmal").
213. Professor Stephen Schulhofer has argued that excessive uniformity,
particularly in drug cases, rather than unwarranted disparity, is the most serious problem with the Guidelines. Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 851-61. Commissioner Ilene Nagel has acknowledged that the Sentencing Commission paid
more attention to uniformity than proportionality. See Nagel, supra note 29, at
934. Nagel explained that "while every effort was made to treat like offenders
alike, less attention was given in the first set of guidelines, partly because of
time constraints, to the possibility of over or under-defining like offenders." Id.
Nagel stated further that "the emphasis was more on making sentences alike,
and less on insuring the likeness of those grouped together for similar treatment." Id.
214. Professor Paul Robinson, the only original member of the Sentencing
Commission who dissented from the Guidelines, warned early on about this
risk of excessive uniformity:
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reinforced disproportionate sentencing. 21 5 For crimes like larceny, fraud, and especially narcotics offenses, the quantity or
value involved drives the sentence, a fact that is often beyond
the defendant's control or expectations. 216 The effect of these
amounts is magnified because alleged related-offenses, in which
the defendant may not have participated personally, are aggregated and the amounts count as much for relatively minor participants in the offense as they do for more culpable
individuals. 2 17 This irrationality, combined with widespread
plea bargaining manipulation and evasion, results in Guideline
ranges that may not reflect anything near the defendant's true
culpability.
The Guidelines' heavy reliance on quantities has also contributed to another, unanticipated, increase in the prosecution's
ability to influence sentences. 2 18 One of the most unsettling developments under the Guidelines is the ability of law enforce-

ment officers to manipulate the likely sentence by selecting the
amount of narcotics to be proposed to a suspect in an undercover
Uniformity is desirable, however, only among offenses and offenders
that are similar according to the factors that are relevant to the system's distributive principle. For example, a system that sanctions all
forms of unlawful takings solely according to the value of the property
taken may increase uniformity, but may frustrate both deterrence and
just punishment.
Robinson, supra note 45, at 9.
215. See Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 853-54 (criticizing the Guidelines' reliance on quantities in drug cases). At times, the Guidelines go beyond mere
irrationality into the realm of the bizarre. The Supreme Court noted in Chapman v. United States, that the Guideline range for a first offender convicted of
selling 100 doses of LSD can range from 10 to 16 months if the drug was in pure
form, to 27 to 33 months if it was contained in gelatin capsules, to 63 to 78
months if the LSD were on blotter paper, to 188 to 235 months if the doses were
in sugar cubes. Chapman v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1924 n.2 (1991)
reh'g denied 112 S.Ct. 17 (1991); see also Alschuler, supra note 34, at 919.
216. See supra note 176 and preceding text.
217. Another source of disproportionality is the prosecutor's sole power to
authorize the judge to depart from the Guidelines based on the defendant's substantial assistance. See supra notes 64-66. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
those higher up in a criminal enterprise, having more information that is useful
to the government, may receive a disproportional amount of such motions and
thus receive shorter sentences than their less culpable collaborators. Freed,
supra note 31, at 1704-05.
218. See Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The FederalSentencing Guidelines'Failure to Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before
Arrest, 1993 Wis. L. REy. 187, 205-14 (1993) (arguing that the Guidelines encourage and enable prosecutors and law enforcement officials to manipulate investigations and sting operations in order to increase offender's prison terms).
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operation. 2 19 Because the amount under consideration is critical for Guideline and mandatory minimum penalty purposes,
the government can in effect determine which defendants receive longer sentences by suggesting larger amounts. 2 20
The emerging picture is hardly encouraging. It is by no
means clear that alleged related-offense sentencing has accomplished the Sentencing Commission's goals of increasing proportionality and limiting the impact of plea bargaining 22 1 and the
power of the prosecutor.2 2 2 There is little evidence that the
Guidelines have significantly reduced unwarranted sentencing
disparity.2 23 Instead, the Guidelines produce unfairness, irra219. For a description of such practices, see Heaney, supra note 42, at 19597.
220. Some courts have attempted to mitigate the effects of such practices.
See, e.g., United States v. Barth 990 F.2d 422, 424-25 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing the concept of "sentencing entrapment" that may, in some cases, justify a
downward departure from the Guidelines).
221. According to the Sentencing Commission's own data, published as part
of a congressionally mandated evaluation of the Guidelines, there is an uncertain connection between the alleged related offense sentencing rules and the
impact plea agreements have on sentences. See COMMISSION, OPERATION RE-

PORT, supra note 68, at 188, tbl. 142. For example, in the following pairs of
offense types, the percentage of guilty plea cases in which the plea agreement
had an impact on the sentence is comparable:
§ 3D1.2(d) grouped offenses
non-§ 3D1.2(d) grouped offenses
drug trafficking
drug possession; burglary
larceny; embezzlement
immigration
tax; firearms
robbery
222. See Heaney, supra note 42, at 229 (arguing that "it is clear that the
prosecutor has as much control under the present system as he would under an
offense-of-conviction model").
223. There has been a vigorous debate over whether or to what extent the
Guidelines may be reducing unwarranted disparity. The evidence is best described as inconclusive. See Tonry, supra note 208, at 142-45 (reviewing evaluations of the Guidelines). The Sentencing Commission contends that the
Guidelines have significantly reduced disparity, at least for the selected groups
of offenses the Commission studied. COMIssioN, OPERATION REPORT, supra

note 68, at executive summary 31-54. The General Accounting Office determined after reviewing the Commission's analysis and conducting its own study
that although the Commission's analysis demonstrated some reduction in disparity for selected offenses, "limitations and inconsistencies in the data available for pre-Guidelines and Guidelines offenders made it impossible to
determine how effective the sentencing guidelines have been in reducing overall
sentencing disparity." U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: CENTRAL QUEsTIONS REMAIN UNANSWERED 10-11 (1992). Interestingly,

the chairman of the Sentencing Commission urged the G.A.O. to title its study
"Sentencing Guidelines: Disparity Reduced, But Some Questions Remain." Id.
at 182; see also Heaney, supra note 42, at 164 (arguing that "there is little
evidence to suggest that the congressional objective of reducing unwarranted
sentencing disparity has been achieved"); William W. Willdns, Response to
Judge Heaney, 29 Am. CEm L. REv. 795, 799-807 (1992) (criticizing Judge He-
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tionality, and hidden disparity. Rather than being an effective
compromise, the Guidelines seem to have captured some of the
worst aspects of both charge- and real-offense sentencing.
V. A REVISED APPROACH TO REAL-OFFENSE
SENTENCING
A.

ALLEGED RELATED-OFFENSE SENTENCING

The Sentencing Commission's adoption of mandatory alleged related-offense sentencing is indefensible. The theoretical
underpinnings of this radical reform are weak and unpersuasive. This effort has also failed to achieve the Commission's
aims: proportionality is fragile, prosecutorial power is heightened, and the parties retain the ability to circumvent the guidelines through plea bargaining, an opportunity they are
exercising in part because of the harshness and rigidity generated by this form of real-offense sentencing. At the same time,
the principal drawback of real-offense sentencing, the appearance and reality of unfairness, has been all too apparent. In addition, the evidence available from state guideline systems that
have rejected alleged related-offense sentencing does not validate the fear of uncontrolled plea bargaining that apparently
motivated the Sentencing Commission. 2 24 Any legislature or
sentencing commission constructing a new sentencing system
should reject this approach and should confront real-offense sentencing in a manner more in harmony with the goals of sentencing reform.
Some have suggested reform rather than abolition.2 25 Certainly there is some appeal to this argument, at least if one accepts the legitimacy of basing sentences on crimes not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. A critical examination of how a
modified alleged related-offense system might work demonstrates, however, the shortcomings of a reform approach. A first
step might be to eliminate consideration of alleged criminal conaney's methodology and conclusions); cf. Alschuler, supra note 33, at 915-18
(suggesting that studies purporting to demonstrate reduced disparity under
sentencing guidelines are misleading).
224. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 541 (citing studies of Minnesota, Washington, and Florida experiences for the proposition that "plea bargaining behaviors
have not changed radically following the adoption of conviction-offense
practice").
225. See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, Five Guideline Improvements, 5 FED. SENTENciNG REP. 190 (1993).
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duct of which the defendant has been acquitted. 2 26 Although apparently constitutional under current doctrine because of the
lower standard of proof applicable at sentencing, holding one accountable for a charge that the government has tried and failed
to prove is probably the most disturbing form of alleged relatedoffense sentencing. 227 The perceived unfairness of this approach
had, prior to the introduction of the Guidelines, led the United
States Parole Commission, which itself took a real-offense approach to release decisions, generally to refuse to consider acquitted conduct. 2 28 The Sentencing Commission recently
2 29
considered but declined to take a similar step.
Rejecting acquitted conduct would be important symbolically, and it would eliminate some of the most unseemly results
under the Guidelines. 23 0 The practical impact of such a step is
unclear, however, given the lack of available information about
the frequency of acquitted conduct having a measurable effect
on the Guidelines' calculations. Furthermore, the government
could undercut the potential impact of such a restriction
through its charging policies. If the prosecutor believed that acquittal on a particular charge was a realistic possibility, the
prosecutor could simply decline to pursue that charge and seek
to introduce it as an alleged related-offense at sentencing. With226. The Ninth Circuit, alone among the federal courts of appeals, has restricted the use of acquitted conduct under the guidelines. See United States v.
Brady, 928 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that upward departure cannot be
based on acquitted conduct).
227. See Reitz, supra note 13, at 552 (recommending "the restoration of the
legal force of acquittals at sentencing through a prohibition of the consideration
of facts embraced in charges for which the defendant has been acquitted").
228. An important limitation on the Parole Commission guidelines' real-offense approach was that "the Commission shall not consider in any determination, charges upon which a prisoner was found not guilty after trial unless
reliable information is presented that was not introduced into evidence at such
trial (e.g., a subsequent admission or other clear indication of guilt)." 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.19(c) (1980). The Parole Commission, which is in the process of being
phased out, modified this limitation after the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
were introduced by substituting a statement of general policy with respect to
such charges. 56 Fed. Reg. 30,867 (1991).
229. See U.S. SENTENCING COMIUSSION, PROPOSED GUIDELINE AMENDMENTS
FOR PUBLIC CoMMENT amend. 1 (1993); see also 57 Fed. Reg. 62832 (Dec. 31,
1992).
230. For example, in United States v. Concepcion, the Second Circuit ruled
that the sentencing court correctly increased the defendant's applicable guideline range from 12 to 36 months to 210 to 262 months based upon conduct for
which the defendant had been acquitted. United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d
369, 387-89 (2d Cir. 1992); see also id. at 393-94 (Newman, J., concurring)
(describing as "bizarre" this result required by the Guidelines and expressing
"the hope that some revision may receive serious consideration").
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out an acquittal on the charge, the information would not be
barred. The prosecutor would sacrifice the longer statutory
maximum penalty that would apply if there were an additional
count of conviction, but given the prevailing high maximum pen231
alties, in most cases this would be only a slight impediment.
Thus, although eliminating consideration of acquitted conduct
would, on balance, be an improvement, it could also have the
counterintuitive tendency to further erode the primacy of the
guilt determining phase of the criminal process.
A related step would be to reject inclusion of alleged relatedoffenses if such related charges were dropped as part of a plea
bargain. This would remedy one of the more blatant examples of
unfairness in plea bargaining under the Guidelines, 23 2 depriving the defendant of the presumed benefit of a plea bargain
without the opportunity to withdraw the plea.2 33 Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit has already mandated such an approach. 23 4 As
with banning acquitted conduct, however, such a reform might
have some unintended consequences and open new avenues for
prosecutorial manipulation. Prosecutors might more frequently
engage in pre-indictment plea bargaining,2 35 or use superseding
indictments to get around such a restriction.
To take the opposite approach, real-offense sentencing advocates might argue that the Sentencing Commission should extend related-offense sentencing to curtail plea bargaining. One
of the problems with the Guidelines' approach is that it fails to
explain why some offenses are subject to alleged related-offense
sentencing while others are not.23 6 As the Sentencing Commission recognized, however, full real-offense sentencing would be
unmanageable and unworkable. Furthermore, new plea bargaining techniques would meet any additional steps toward
real-offense sentencing. Plea negotiators are very creative in devising ways to evade restrictions placed upon them. Stephen
231. Before the Guidelines, statutory maximum penalties were generally set
with an indeterminate sentencing system in mind. The maximum was set for
the theoretical "worst case," and even such an offender would probably have
been eligible for parole after serving one-third of the sentence. Statutory maximum penalties have not generally been adjusted to more realistic levels in light
of determinate sentencing guidelines. See Tonry, Real Offense, supra note 6, at
1593.
232. See Yellen, supra note 199, at 573-74.
233. See Tonry & Coffee, supra note 19, at 158-60 (discussing illusory plea
bargaining).
234. See United States v. Fine, 946 F.2d 650, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1991).
235. See Yellen, supra note 199.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 155-58.
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Schulhofer has predicted that if Congress closes the "loopholes"
that exclude telephone counts and simple possession from
mandatory minimum penalties, guilty pleas to misprision of felony, false statements, and filing false tax returns will proliferate. 23 7 The same sort of reaction is likely to be produced by any
effort by the Sentencing Commission to further extend the reach
of the Guidelines' real-offense provisions.
A more intriguing reform would be for the Sentencing Commission to reconsider both the weight given to alleged relatedoffeknses and the categories of offenses that receive such treatment. Currently if an offense is within section 3D1.2(d), alleged
related-offenses are not only included in the Guideline calculation, they count as much as if the defendant were convicted of
those unproven charges. The Sentencing Commission might
strike a different balance by providing that when sentencing
calls for inclusion of alleged related-offenses, such offenses will
count less than they would if the defendant were actually convicted of them. 238 The Guidelines could duplicate the current
treatment of multiple counts of conviction for non-§ 3D1.2(d) offenses, giving such additional counts a relatively small, but predictable effect on the sentence. 23 9 Alternatively, the Guidelines
might designate a range of weights to be given to alleged related-offenses, depending on factors such as the defendant's role
in the alleged related-offense. 2 40 It might matter, for example,
whether the defendant actually committed the related-offense,
or whether the Guildelines hold the defendant responsible for
that conduct on the basis of conspiratorial or accessorial liability. The sentencing judge might be allowed some discretion in
determining the weight given to alleged related-offenses.
237. Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 207.
238. See United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 394-95 (2d Cir. 1992)
(Newman, J., concurring) (opining that the Sentencing Commission made a "debatable but defensible decision" to incorporate modified real-offense sentencing
with "the entirely unjustified decision to price relevant conduct at exactly the
same level of severity as convicted conduct").
239. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
240. This would be similar to the approach taken by the Guidelines in several areas. For example, the aggravated assault guideline increases the offense
level by two, four, or six levels depending upon whether the defendant caused
"bodily injury," "serious bodily injury," or "permanent or life-threatening bodily
injury." U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 2A2.2(b)(3). The court is also allowed to "interpolate" and increase the offense level by three or five levels if the injury is
between the specified categories. See id. The Guidelines also provide a range of
adjustments, from two to four levels, depending upon the extent of the defendant's aggravating or mitigating role. See id. §§ 3Bl.1, 3B1.2.
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Such an approach has several advantages over the current
system. The unfairness of sentencing a defendant based on conduct for which he has not been convicted would remain, but in a
diminished form. Proportionality might be increased compared
to a charge-offense system. Parties could use plea bargaining to
influence the sentence, but to a lesser extent than in a pure
charge-based system. Similarly, plea bargaining would not be
as illusory as in a real-offense system, because dropping a count
would limit, although not completely eliminate, the effect of that
wrongdoing on the sentence.
In assessing this suggested modification, it is useful to compare the Guidelines' alleged related-offense approach with its
treatment of the defendant's criminal history. The Guidelines,
like most two dimensional guideline grids, 24 ' place the current
offense on one axis and the defendant's criminal history on the
other. Depending on the "slope" of the line, the criminal history
can have a greater or lesser impact on the sentence. The Guidelines give the current offense considerably more weight than any
single prior conviction. The most a prior conviction can increase
the defendant's sentence is an amount equal to two offense
levels. 2 42 It seems incongruous that an alleged offense for which
a defendant has not been convicted can have a significantly
greater impact on the sentence than a prior offense for which the
defendant was convicted.
The Sentencing Commission could further restrict the category of offenses to which alleged related-offense sentencing applies. As discussed above, 24 3 the Commission did not carefully
articulate a rationale for determining which offenses were included in section 1B1.3 (a)(2). The Guidelines could generally
ban alleged related-offense sentencing but allow for exceptions
2 44
when there is a particularly strong policy justification.
241. See Miller, supra note 10.
242. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 5A (Sentencing Table). For example, an
offender with an offense level of sixteen and a criminal history score of one
would have a range of 21 to 27 months. Id. If the offender had an additional
conviction worth the maximum three points, the offender's new range would be
27 to 33 months. See id. § 4A1.1 (setting the maximum points for an additional
conviction), § 5A (Sentencing Table). That is the same range as for an offense
level of eighteen and criminal history category I. See id. § 5A (Sentencing
Table).
243. See supra text accompanying note 157.
244. Washington's guidelines take this approach. For certain categories of
offenses, such as major economic crimes and crimes involving ongoing patterns
of child sexual abuse or violence against children, courts may depart from the
Guidelines if they find that the count or counts of conviction understate the
frequency of the defendant's conduct. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)
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One or more of these restrictions on alleged related-offense
sentencing, perhaps combined with such procedural reforms as
applying the rules of evidence or requiring proof of other offenses by clear and convincing evidence, 2 45 could effect a more
meaningful compromise between real- and charge-offense sentencing. Identifying a coherent modified approach would be difficult, but the Sentencing Commission's current approach, both
2 46
rigid and unpredictable, seems to be among the least sensible.
In the end, reforming alleged related-offense sentencing
may alleviate the symptoms, but the disease will remain. The
problems that alleged related-offense sentencing attempts to address are real, but there is little reason to believe that the goals
of alleged related-offense sentencing are attainable or worth the
sacrifice of fairness and due process. Greater attention to charging and bargaining practices, rather than this form of real-offense sentencing, is the proper direction. 24 7 An offender should
only be punished for the offenses that he has admitted committing, or that the government has proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Sentencing Commission's ratification of alleged related-offense sentencing has done the integrity and fairness of
the federal criminal justice system a disservice and should be
repealed.

B.

CONSIDERING OTHER REAL-OFFENSE CATEGORIES

This Article has scrutinized and urged the rejection of alleged related-offense sentencing in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. A careful examination of the other forms of real-offense sentencing utilized in the Guidelines is beyond the scope of
this Article and thus this Article will not make any concrete proposal concerning their use. Nonetheless, some initial observations are appropriate. It is important to re-emphasize that
(West 1988); see Reitz, supra note 13, at 539-40 (suggesting that the true basis
for the exception may be "that certain kinds of criminal harms have evoked
special concern from the public and their officials, prompting sporadic decisions
to withhold the safeguards of conviction-offense sentencing").
245. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 32, at 849 (suggesting a requirement of
"testimony in court and proof by clear and convincing evidence, at least when
dispute centers on factors such as drug quantities that have major non-discretionary impact on the applicable Guideline range"); Husseini, supra note 42, at
1407-11 (arguing for adoption of the "clear and convincing" standard for Guideline determinations).
246. Such high reliance on amounts and quantities also increases the parties' ability to manipulate the Guidelines, directly undercutting the purpose of
alleged related-offense sentencing.
247. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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before embracing any particular real-offense element, a sentencing commission must first establish its principles and goals, and
then determine which
types of sentencing information will fur2 48
ther those goals.
Alleged more-serious-offenses,2 4 9 alleged criminal history,
and criminal offense characteristics 250 raise the same philosophical issues as alleged related-offense sentencing. These practices deprecate the importance of the trial stage by basing the
sentence on criminal conduct for which the defendant has not
been convicted. Furthermore, alleged related-offense sentencing's failure casts serious doubt on the belief that such forms of
real-offense sentencing serve any necessary function. A sentencing commission should be very hesitant to deviate from the principle that a conviction is a prerequisite to punishing a defendant
for conduct the legislature has chosen to label as criminal. If
guidelines do incorporate such factors, the weight accorded them
should be severely limited, as suggested above for alleged related-offenses, 2 5 1 and a standard of proof more stringent than a
preponderance of the evidence should be applied.
A caveat is necessary here. Some special rules are probably
needed for offenses, such as mail fraud2 52 and RICO, 25 3 that
cover broad ranges of conduct.2 5 4 Violations of these statutes
can differ so greatly from one another as to render any single
sentencing guideline impractical. If judges simply apply the
248. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 238-242 and accompanying text.
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
253. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
254. Ironically, concern with offenses such as mail and wire fraud and RICO
shaped the Sentencing Commission's early debates about real-offense sentencing. See Tonry, Seven Easy Steps, supra note 6, at 357 (surmising that the
Commission apparently believed that "federal criminal law is incomparably
more complex than are state criminal laws and that many federal offenses in
their labels and elements provide no meaningful basis for measuring culpability"). This view has several weaknesses. First, even if true, it would not justify
adopting alleged related-offense sentencing, the critical aspect of the Commission's compromise, because the aforementioned complexity has nothing to do
with the need to sentence defendants based on offenses beyond the offense of
conviction. At most it could justify an expansive version of offense characteristic sentencing. Second, most federal prosecutions are not of this allegedly complex variety, but involve drug crimes, common law offenses like theft, robbery
and embezzlement, and uncomplicated crimes such as immigration offenses.
Id.; see also, U.S. SENTENCING COMAISSION, 1992 ANNuAL REPORT 45, tbl. 15

(1993) (reporting that 41% of defendants sentenced had a primary offense of
drug trafficking).
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guideline most applicable to the underlying offense conduct, the
approach apparently mandated by the current Guidelines, 25 5r
they can sentence the defendant for an offense that the government has not proved. A compromise is probably appropriate.
One option the sentencing commission might consider would be
to impose a higher standard of proof, such as clear and convincing evidence, for allegations going beyond the facts proved at
trial or admitted as part of a guilty plea. In addition, the sentence for these offenses should be less than that applicable to the
underlying offenses if they had been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Noncriminal offense characteristics comprise a far more legitimate category of sentencing information. A system that did
not take account of aggravating or mitigating factors beyond
broad statutory definitions would risk being too crude and disproportionate. Noncriminal offense characteristics are among
the least controversial forms of real-offense sentencing, because
they do not require defendants to receive enhanced penalties
based on crimes for which they have not been convicted. Virtually all participants in and observers of the criminal justice system acknowledge the propriety of including at least some offense
characteristics in the sentencing calculations. 2 56 It is notable
that even critics of real-offense sentencing 2 57 and guideline systems purporting to reject it258 accept at least some reliance on
noncriminal offense characteristics.
255. See U.S.S.G, supra note 1, § 2E1.l(a) (providing that the base offense
level for racketeering offenses is the greater of 19 or the level applicable to the
underlying conduct); id. § 2F1.1 application note 13 (providing that the fraud
guideline does not apply where the offense is more aptly covered by another
guideline).
256. Judges appear to believe strongly in considering noncriminal offense
characteristics. See WHEELER ET AL., supra note 23, at 54-80. The support of
the participants in the criminal justice system can be critical to the success of
guidelines, because the more support exists, the less likely manipulation and
evasion will occur.
257. Compare Freed, supra note 32, at 1712-15 (criticizing the relevant conduct principle) with id. at 1705 (arguing that "each case involves unique offenders and offense circumstances, and their underlying stories . . . need to be
assessed and sentenced by experienced professionals exercising human judgment") (citation omitted). But see Heaney, supra note 42, at 228-30 (recommending replacement of the current Guidelines with a pure charge-offense
model).
258. Washington's statute allows judges to depart from the standard guideline range if warranted by the circumstances of the offense. The statute contains a list of "illustrative factors" that may warrant a departure. Possible
mitigating factors include victim initiation of the incident, duress, or diminished capacity. Aggravating factors include selecting vulnerable victim, sub-
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Proper use of noncriminal offense characteristics may not
only further proportionality, it may also prevent overpunishment. If judges are precluded from considering aggravating offense characteristics, and can only impose one sentence level on
all defendants convicted of a particular offense, there would be a
tendency for penalties to be set with more serious offenders in
mind, thus overpenalizing lower level offenders. 2 5 9 One could
argue that all relevant sentencing factors should be incorporated into criminal statutes and treated as elements of the offense. 2 60 This approach is philosophically pure, but somewhat
unrealistic. Criminal codes would become unwieldy, and the
trial process would bog down under the weight of additional fact
finding. Furthermore, legislatures are not capable of defining in
advance all of the relevant sentencing factors and the combinations in which they may occur. As Franklin Zimring has written, "we may simply lack the ability to comprehensively define
in advance those elements of an offense that should be considered in fixing a criminal sentence." 26 1 A sentencing commission
also cannot anticipate all such issues, which is why sentencing
guidelines require a reasonable departure mechanism.
A potential problem with allowing consideration of noncriminal offense characteristics but not criminal offense characteristics, is that it may give legislatures an incentive to reduce the
specificity in criminal statutes even further. Legislatures may
realize that if they include a factor in the definition of a crime,
the judge may not rely on it at sentencing unless proved at trial
or admitted as part of a guilty plea. By omitting the factor from
the definition of the offense, a judge will be able to take it into
account at sentencing. Although some legislatures might respond in this manner, allowing consideration of noncriminal offense characteristics but not criminal offense characteristics
stantial monetary loss, or abuse of a position of trust. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 9.94A.390(1)-(2) (West 1988).
259. For example, if the amount of money taken in a fraud cannot influence
the Guideline range, the Sentencing Commission will have three choices. The
range for fraud could be based on a small loss, a middle level, or a large loss. It
seems reasonable to assume that the Commission would opt for something in
the middle, with pressure to increase the level.
260. Professor Susan Herman has argued that the Guidelines system violates the Due Process Clause by relying so heavily on facts determined at sentencing, instead of incorporating such sentencing factors within the statutory
definition of offenses. Herman, supra note 42.

261. Franklin E. Zimring, Making the Punishment Fit the Crime: A Consumer's Guide to Sentencing Reform, in SENTENCING 331 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch, eds. 1981).
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seems to be a lesser evil than either banning noncriminal offense characteristics, which would establish a pure charge-offense system, or allowing consideration of criminal offense
characteristics.
Unfettered consideration of noncriminal offense characteristics, however, may not be advisable. A number of important
questions concerning the reliance on these factors remain, including the appropriate extent their impact on sentencing, the
procedures that should be employed to determine essential sen26 2
tencing facts, the relevance of the defendant's state of mind,
2
63
For example, a
and the standard of review of such decisions.
check on the potential abuse of noncriminal offense characteristics would be to limit the weight given to such factors. Under
the current Guidelines the "tail" of sentencing factors often wags
the "dog" of the underlying offense. 2 " This not only presents
serious due process concerns, it also heightens the ability of the
parties to manipulate and circumvent the Guidelines through
plea bargaining. The Commission should experiment with limits on the value of such offense characteristic factors. Perhaps
the Commission should limit each factor, or all such factors in
the aggregate, to a set percentage increase in the base offense
level.
Offender characteristics do not raise the specter of punishing a defendant for a crime without a conviction. Nevertheless,
there may be other reasons to limit reliance on such information, such as the possibility of discriminatory application. The
defendant's history of criminal conviction, based on prior guilty
pleas or convictions, is also a legitimate factor to consider,
although as with noncriminal offense characteristics, the weight
given to this factor should be carefully considered.
An issue requiring further reflection is the distinction in the
federal context between criminal and noncriminal offense characteristics. Because federal criminal jurisdiction is, at least in
theory, limited in nature, some acts that certainly constitute
262. For example, whether a defendant who set out to obtain $1,000,000 by
fraud should be treated the same as or differently from one who simply set out
to defraud someone and was pleasantly surprised that the crime netted
$1,000,000.
263. Possible standards range from an unreviewable decision by the judge
at which the rules of evidence do not apply (essentially the method in the preGuidelines system) to a full evidentiary hearing requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
264. For a devastating critique of the Sentencing Commission's reliance on
amounts in determining the sentence for drug cases, see Alschuler, supra note
33, at 918-24.
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state crimes are not federal crimes. A homicide committed in
the course of a kidnapping or mail fraud, for example, probably
does not constitute a federal offense. 265 It is arguable that such
a death is simply a noncriminal offense characteristic which the
judge may properly consider in determining the sentence for kidnapping or mail fraud. If so, it would be ironic that the court
could take into account a killing, but not less serious misconduct
that was covered by a federal criminal statute. Alternatively,
because it is almost certainly a state crime, it is arguable that a
killing is really a criminal offense characteristic, in which case
limits should be placed on its use in a federal sentencing. Because the federal government has no ability to bring charges
based on the aggravating conduct in such cases, it might not be
appropriate to preclude any consideration of a killing at sentencing. Perhaps the Guidelines should require the government to
prove such offense characteristics beyond a reasonable doubt at
sentencing before a judge can rely on them.
The propriety of considering post-offense behavior, such as
the acceptance of responsibility or obstruction or justice, derives
from the nature of such behavior. The obstruction enhancement
in the Guidelines 266 generally involves increasing the defendant's punishment based on a criminal act, such as committing
perjury at trial. This practice, like alleged related-offenses, alleged more-serious-offenses, and criminal offense characteristics, is inconsistent with the requirement of proof of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor is always free to pursue additional charges against a defendant who has committed perjury, or has obstructed justice in some other way.
The acceptance of responsibility reduction, 2 67 in contrast,
stands on firmer ground. It does not concern conduct for which
the defendant could be criminally charged; instead it identifies a
factor bearing on the defendant's culpability. In this sense it is
like offender characteristics. There is even less to object to here,
though, because unlike offender characteristics, acceptance of
responsibility is a one way street in the defendant's favor. Finally, the acceptance reduction is not only consistent with long265. For examples of federal homicide statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 34 (1988)
(homicide in connection with destruction of aircraft or motor vehicles); 18
U.S.C. § 351(a) (1988) (killing of a member of Congress, cabinet official, or
Supreme Court Justice); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) (1988) (killing of a witness, victim,
or informant).
266. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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systemic
standing practice, 268 it also furthers an important
26 9
function of offering an inducement for guilty pleas.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Six years of experience with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should lay to rest the notion that the most ambitious goals
of real-offense sentencing are attainable, or desirable. The Sentencing Commission's incorporation of alleged related-offense
real-offense sentencing in the Guidelines has led to complexity,
inconsistent application, and a loss of confidence in the system,
while at the same time failing to ensure proportionality and to
check prosecutorial power to influence sentences. The major
sources of the Guidelines' failure-their rigidity, complexity and
severity-are all linked closely to the Sentencing Commission's
version of real-offense sentencing. This "cornerstone" of the
Guidelines is badly in need of repair.
On a broader level, the failed federal experiment with
mandatory real-offense sentencing may have some important
implications for the future of sentencing reform. A consensus
has emerged that the Guidelines have failed because they have
tried to do too much, often contrary to the sound experiencebased judgments of judges, lawyers, and probation officers. A
more sensible system would proceed more modestly, narrowing
and guiding judicial discretion, not shifting it to administrative
agencies, prosecutors and probation officers.
The search for a just and effective sentencing system is an
arduous one. The Sentencing Commission's version of real-offense sentencing, however, is not part of the solution.

268. See COMMISSION, SuPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 66, at 64-66 (indicating that a reduction in sentence due to the Guidelines' acceptance of responsibility is similar to reductions already obtained in plea bargaining).
269. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 3E1.1.

